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EMBRACING LOVING: TRAIT-SPECIFIC MARRIAGE
LAWS AND HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Christopher R. Leslie†

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent Windsor opinion, the focus
of marriage equality litigation has returned to challenging state gender-specific marriage laws that make a couple’s right to marry a function of their
genders. The outcomes of these future legal challenges will be affected by the
level of scrutiny that courts apply. To date, all courts that have applied
heightened scrutiny have held same-sex marriage prohibitions to be unconstitutional, while courts applying rational basis review have often upheld such
laws.
Laws that classify or discriminate based on gender are generally subject
to heightened scrutiny. Yet the vast majority of courts have held that
gender-specific marriage laws neither classify nor discriminate based on gender because the laws apply to both men and women, and thus are not subject
to heightened scrutiny. In Loving v. Virginia, however, the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the parallel argument that if a race-specific marriage law
applies equally to all affected races then heightened scrutiny is unnecessary.
Courts wishing to avoid heightened scrutiny have attempted to distinguish Loving. For example, courts have concluded that Loving is irrelevant to the level of scrutiny applied in equal protection challenges to
gender-specific marriage laws because, while miscegenation laws were implemented to further the theory of white supremacy, gender-specific marriage
laws do not have a similar improper discriminatory purpose. In particular,
they assert that gender-specific marriage laws are not motivated by a desire to
put one gender in a superior position to another gender.
This Article explains why these attempts to distinguish Loving are
flawed. First, courts misapply the basic equal protection framework when
they demand a discriminatory motivation for gender-specific marriage laws
as part of determining the appropriate level of scrutiny. Furthermore, even if
intent were relevant to that determination, supporters of same-sex marriage
bans seek to implement and reinforce a gendered model of marriage in which
a woman is presumed to be subordinate to a man. To social conservatives,
who are the driving force behind gender-specific marriage laws, same-sex
marriage is dangerous precisely because it threatens the gendered model of
marriage in which a husband dominates his wife. The Article concludes by
noting that following the logic of Loving, same-sex marriage bans necessa† Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of Law. The author thanks
Erwin Chemerinsky, Doug NeJaime, and Tony Reese for providing comments on earlier
drafts. Jennifer Steeve provided excellent research assistance.
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rily classify based on gender and, thus, gender-specific marriage laws should
receive heightened scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
Gay and lesbian Americans came one step closer to full citizenship with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Windsor.1 The Windsor
Court invalidated Section 3 of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which denied federal recognition to valid state marriages
between same-sex couples.2 Yet despite this important victory, most
states continue to maintain gender-specific marriage laws, which deny
same-sex couples access to marriage.3 The Windsor decision shifts the
battleground for marriage equality back to those states.
The outcomes of future legal challenges to state marriage bans
will be affected in large measure by the level of scrutiny that courts
apply. In the litigation to date, all courts that have applied heightened scrutiny have held same-sex marriage prohibitions to be unconstitutional, while courts applying rational basis review have generally
upheld such laws.4 Laws that discriminate based on gender are sub1
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (concluding that the
federal Defense of Marriage Act is invalid because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity”).
2
Id. at 2682.
3
See id. at 2689 (noting that, at time of writing, only twelve states (and the District of
Columbia) recognized a right of same-sex couples to marry).
4
These decisions to uphold gender-specific marriage laws under rational basis review are themselves questionable given the lack of any evidence or credible theory as to
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ject to heightened scrutiny. This should have important implications
for constitutional challenges to the remaining same-sex marriage bans
because gender-specific marriage laws are a form of sex discrimination in that such laws make an individual’s legal right to marry one’s
partner a function of gender. For example, a man can marry a
woman, but a woman cannot.
Most courts, however, have held that gender-specific marriage
laws neither classify nor discriminate based on sex and thus are not
subject to heightened scrutiny.5 In order to so hold, courts have had
to distinguish the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia,
which invalidated miscegenation laws.6 Miscegenation laws—which
criminalized or voided marriages between a white person and a
nonwhite person of the opposite gender—were once the norm in
American states.7 When states maintained miscegenation laws, a majority of Americans considered these laws to be both rational and commonsensical.8 Nonetheless, the Loving Court applied heightened
scrutiny and struck down all remaining miscegenation laws.9
As civil rights advocates began challenging miscegenation laws as
unconstitutional race discrimination, the laws’ supporters sought to
avoid heightened scrutiny by arguing that legal prohibitions on interracial marriage did not discriminate based on race because the laws
applied equally to both white and nonwhite people who wished to
marry across legally defined racial boundaries.10 Overturning almost
a century of case law, the Court in Loving explicitly rejected the argument that if a race-specific marriage law applies equally to both races
then it does not discriminate based on race.11
By today’s standards, these “equal application” arguments rejected in Loving are transparently false. Miscegenation laws are now
recognized as one of the hallmarks of race discrimination in American history.12 And yet, today’s opponents of marriage equality are
dusting off the same equal application arguments in their defense of
how denying same-sex couples access to marriage serves any legitimate purpose. See Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (concluding that “excluding
same-sex couples from marriage is simply not rationally related to a legitimate state interest”). That, however, is not the focus of this Article.
5
See infra Part II.B.
6
See infra Part III.
7
See Kenneth E. Payson, Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1233, 1248 (1996).
8
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 321 (2004) (noting that, in the 1950s, more than 90%
of white Americans opposed interracial marriage).
9
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
10
See, e.g., id. at 8 (discussing the argument of the State of Virginia for rational basis
review).
11
Id. at 10–12 (repudiating Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)).
12
See infra Part III.A.
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prohibitions on same-sex marriage, including state constitutional
amendments and, prior to the Windsor opinion, the federal Defense of
Marriage Act.13 Yet, surprisingly, these discredited, recycled arguments have proven successful in court.14
The majority of courts to consider the issue have held that
gender-specific marriage laws do not discriminate based on gender if
they apply equally to men and women.15 In other words, according to
most courts, so long as both men and women are prohibited from
entering same-sex marriages, then no sex discrimination has occurred. This is the same equal application theory that the Supreme
Court rejected in Loving.16 Consequently, many courts wishing to
avoid heightened scrutiny have attempted to distinguish Loving.17
This Article discusses these attempts and exposes their flaws.
This Article demonstrates how those judges who hold that heightened scrutiny is unwarranted because gender-specific marriage laws
do not classify based on sex are recycling the precise argument—the
equal application theory—that states and judges used from the 1800s
to the 1960s to hold that miscegenation laws did not discriminate on
the basis of race. Part One lays out the basic law of equal protection.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”18 The Equal Protection Clause limits the ability of the federal and state governments to enact discriminatory laws
and “requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and
their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”19 The same legal
test that restricts the states through the Fourteenth Amendment limits
the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.20
Part I reviews equal protection analysis, which is a three-step process. Step One of the analysis requires the court to determine
whether the challenged law classifies people according to a particular
trait.21 After the classification is identified in Step One, Step Two requires the court to determine the level of scrutiny associated with that
13
See Stephen Clark, Same-Sex But Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 107, 111 (2002).
14
See infra Part II.B.
15
See infra Part II.B.
16
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
17
See infra Part III.
18
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
20
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570 (9th Cir.
1990).
21
See infra Part I.
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trait.22 For example, courts apply strict scrutiny to laws that classify
people based on race, while applying intermediate scrutiny to genderbased classifications. Strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are
forms of heightened scrutiny. If a law is not evaluated with heightened scrutiny, it receives rational basis review, which is extremely deferential. Step Three requires the court to apply the appropriate level
of scrutiny. If the challenged law fails that level of scrutiny, then it
violates the Equal Protection Clause.23 Each step in this process is
distinct.
Part II presents the basic case for why prohibitions against
same-sex marriage discriminate based on sex and thus are subject to
heightened scrutiny. Most courts have rejected heightened scrutiny
based on sex discrimination by asserting that these laws apply equally
to both sexes, because neither a man nor a woman can marry a person
of the same gender. This equal application theory is the same argument that states with miscegenation laws, like Virginia, used to claim
that their race-specific laws did not discriminate on the basis of race.24
States argued that white people and black people were treated the
same: neither could marry across racial lines. In Loving, the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the equal application theory and applied
heightened scrutiny.25
Part III shows how judges in same-sex marriage cases have sought
to distinguish Loving in order to avoid applying heightened scrutiny.
Judges have made three arguments. First, courts have concluded that
Loving is irrelevant to the level of scrutiny applied in equal protection
challenges to gender-specific marriage laws because miscegenation
laws were implemented to further the theory of white supremacy.26
These judges assert that, whereas miscegenation laws had an improper
discriminatory purpose, gender-specific marriage laws do not. Second, these jurists further argue that gender-specific marriage laws do
not handicap either men or women as a group. Finally, they assert
that gender-specific marriage laws are not motivated by a desire to put
one gender in a superior position to another gender in the same manner that race-specific marriage laws were designed to place the white
race in a superior position to nonwhite races.
Part III also explains how these attempts to distinguish Loving are
flawed for three reasons. First, courts misapply the basic equal protec22

See infra Part I.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
24
See, e.g., id. at 8 (discussing the State of Virginia’s contention that, because both
white and black people were punished equally under its miscegenation laws, “these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based on race”).
25
Id. at 11–12.
26
See infra Part III.A.
23

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-5\CRN502.txt

1082

unknown

Seq: 6

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

23-JUL-14

11:40

[Vol. 99:1077

tion framework when they demand a discriminatory motivation for
gender-specific marriage laws in order to determine whether such
laws classify people based on gender. This intent analysis is flawed
because when a law classifies on its face—such as a race-specific cohabitation law or a gender-specific marriage statute—intent is irrelevant to the issue of determining the level of scrutiny for that law. The
fact that miscegenation laws perpetuate the theory of white supremacy
is irrelevant for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, which is
determined by reading the text of the statute and seeing its references
to race.27 In their haste to distinguish Loving, courts conflate the first
and second steps of equal protection analysis.
Second, courts are wrong to use a group-based analysis to distinguish Loving. The right to equal protection of the laws is an individual
right, not a group right.28 In particular, the right to marry recognized
by the Loving Court is an individual right. In analyzing the equal protection claim, the Loving Court states this explicitly. Group-based
analysis is irrelevant for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny
for evaluating the constitutionality of gender-specific marriage laws.
Third, in performing their group-based analysis and attempting
to limit Loving to laws perpetuating white supremacy, courts consistently assert that Loving should not influence the level of scrutiny applied in litigation over gender-specific marriage laws because there is
no evidence that such laws are intended to put one gender in an inferior position to another gender. Historically, however, marriage has
been an intrinsically gendered institution and marriage laws in the
United States were based on assumptions of female inferiority. Supporters of same-sex marriage bans seek to implement and reinforce a
gendered model of marriage in which the woman is presumed to be
subordinate to the man. To social conservatives, who are the driving
force behind gender-specific marriage laws, same-sex marriage is dangerous in large part because it threatens the gendered model of marriage in which a husband dominates his wife. Thus, courts are wrong
to distinguish Loving on the basis that gender-specific marriage laws
do not subordinate women.
The Article concludes by noting that following the logic of Loving, same-sex marriage bans necessarily discriminate based on sex. Instead of trying so hard to distinguish Loving, courts should embrace
the opinion. For the same reason that race-specific marriage laws discriminate based on race, gender-specific marriage laws discriminate
based on gender. Thus, gender-specific marriage laws should receive
heightened scrutiny.
27
28

See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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OF

Equal protection analysis involves three steps.29 The first, which
this Article will refer to as Step One, requires judges to determine
whether the challenged law classifies people based on a particular
trait. Step Two requires the court to determine the level of scrutiny
associated with that trait. The Supreme Court has delineated three
levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational
basis review. Under strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of
proving that the challenged law’s classifications “are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”30 Under
intermediate scrutiny, “restrictions ‘will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state
interest.’”31 Finally, under rational basis review, “a statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”32 Rational basis review is very deferential. The government
“has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a
statutory classification.”33
29
See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 8–11 (applying the three steps by first rejecting the State
of Virginia’s contention that equal application of the statute voids classification, then determining that a high level of scrutiny is appropriate particularly for criminal statutes containing racial classifications, and finally holding that the statute’s racial classification
cannot be justified under the appropriate level of scrutiny); Kan. One-Call Sys., Inc. v.
State, 274 P.3d 625, 635 (Kan. 2012) (listing the three steps in explaining equal protection
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution’s Bill of Rights).
Some courts treat this as a two-step process by collapsing the last two steps (both determining and applying the appropriate level of scrutiny in a single step). See, e.g., United States v.
Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995); (analyzing an equal protection claim
under a two-step process where the court both determines and applies the appropriate
level of scrutiny in the second step); State v. Poole, 46 A.3d 1129, 1132–33 (Me. 2012)
(determining and applying the appropriate level of scrutiny in the second step). Under
either a two-step or a three-step approach to equal protection analysis, the first step of
determining classification is separate from—and independent of—the final step of applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. It is this distinction between classification and application that is important for our purposes.
30
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
31
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (quoting Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996) (noting that under intermediate scrutiny, “[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State”).
32
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
33
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The Court also stated that “courts are
compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when
there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rationalbasis review because it ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality.’” Id. at 321 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)
(“In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds
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The level of scrutiny applied is a function of the trait upon which
the challenged law classifies people. Legal “[c]lassifications based on
race or national origin and classifications affecting fundamental
rights” are suspect and receive strict scrutiny.34 Legal classifications
based on gender and illegitimacy are quasi-suspect and are subject to
intermediate scrutiny.35 Both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny
are forms of heightened scrutiny.36 Classifications that are neither
suspect nor quasi-suspect receive rational basis review.37 While some
courts have held sexual orientation to be a suspect classification entitled to heightened scrutiny,38 most state and federal courts have applied rational basis review to laws that discriminate based on sexual
orientation.39
Determining the appropriate level of scrutiny is more difficult
when the challenged law contains no classifications on its face. Courts
also apply heightened scrutiny to a facially neutral law if that law has a
disparate impact on a group defined by a suspect (or quasi-suspect)
classification and the legislature—or relevant decision-maker—intended that discriminatory impact.40 In this situation, some courts
frame the Step One analysis as “whether the challenged state action
intentionally discriminates between groups of persons.”41 Courts,
along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.”).
34
Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (citations omitted).
35
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065,
1098 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on illegitimacy
and gender.”).
36
Adusumelli v. Steiner, 740 F. Supp. 2d 582, 590 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The two
forms of heightened scrutiny are (1) strict scrutiny, under which a law will be upheld only
if it is ‘narrowly tailored’ to meet ‘compelling government objectives;’ and (2) intermediate scrutiny, which requires that a law be ‘substantially related’ to ‘important government
objectives.’” (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000))).
37
See Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313.
38
See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (N.D. Cal.
2012); (“Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of
scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is
heightened scrutiny.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 430–32 (Conn.
2008) (concluding that sexual orientation should be considered a quasi-suspect
classification).
39
See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining in a parenthetical that High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573–74 (9th Cir. 1990), found that “homosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but are a definable group entitled to rational basis scrutiny for
equal protection purposes”).
40
See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (explaining that “when
a neutral law has a disparate impact upon a group that has historically been the victim of
discrimination, an unconstitutional purpose may still be at work”).
41
SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil, 666 F.3d 678, 685 (10th Cir. 2012). This reference to “intentional discrimination” does not ask whether the discrimination is itself illegal or even
blameworthy. Instead, this inquiry is descriptive, not normative.
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however, should only look for evidence of discriminatory intent during Step One if the statute is facially neutral and, thus, additional evidence is necessary to show that the seemingly neutral law, in effect,
classifies people and treats them differently based on their
classification.42
If a law contains a suspect classification in its text, then the court
should not consider the motive behind that classification during Step
One. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[n]o
inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute.”43 Even if a racial classification
burdens or benefits all races equally, the fact that the government has
used a racial classification automatically triggers strict scrutiny.44 This
is because “[w]hen a distinction between groups of persons appears
on the face of a state law or action, an intent to discriminate is presumed and no further examination of legislative purpose is required.”45 Accordingly, for the purposes of equal protection claims
based on gender discrimination, courts should not look for evidence
of discriminatory intent unless the challenged statute is “genderneutral on its face.”46
Step Three of equal protection analysis requires courts to apply
the appropriate level of scrutiny—arrived at in Step Two—to determine whether the challenged law survives under the applicable test.
As noted, under intermediate scrutiny, “[a] gender classification fails
unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.”47 If the challenged law fails to satisfy the demands of the
42
See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) (“The unlawful administration by state
officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to
be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear
on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be
shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design to favor one individual or
class over another not to be inferred from the action itself.” (citations omitted)).
43
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
44
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (“The [California Department of
Corrections (CDC)] claims that its policy should be exempt from our categorical rule because it is ‘neutral’—that is, it ‘neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more
than any other group or individual.’ In other words, strict scrutiny should not apply because all prisoners are ‘equally’ segregated. The CDC’s argument ignores our repeated
command that ‘racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to
burden or benefit the races equally.’” (citations omitted)).
45
SECSYS, 666 F.3d at 685.
46
See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (“When a statute
gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that its effects upon women are
disproportionably adverse, a twofold inquiry is thus appropriate. The first question is
whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender
based. If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender, the second
question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.”).
47
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (citing Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
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applicable level of scrutiny, that law is declared unconstitutional. In
evaluating equal protection claims based on analogous state constitutional protections, most state courts employ a similar analytical framework.48 State courts also generally apply heightened scrutiny to laws
that classify and discriminate based on gender.49
The level of scrutiny applied in challenges to prohibitions against
same-sex marriage is largely outcome determinative. Some courts
have applied heightened scrutiny because gender-specific marriage
laws classify based on sex and have held that the marriage restriction
violates Equal Protection.50 Other courts have applied heightened
scrutiny after concluding that sexual orientation is a suspect classification and, consequently, have held that precluding same-sex couples
from marrying—or having access to the bundle of rights afforded to
married couples—is unconstitutional under either state or federal
constitutions.51 At least three state Supreme Court opinions recogniz48
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1119 (Kan. 2012) (“There are three levels
of scrutiny: (1) the rational basis standard to determine whether a statutory classification
bears some rational relationship to a valid legislative purpose; (2) a heightened or intermediate scrutiny to determine whether a statutory classification substantially furthers a legitimate legislative purpose; and (3) the strict scrutiny standard to determine whether a
statutory classification is necessary to serve some compelling state interest.”). But see
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Unlike federal equal protection analysis, there is no varying or heightened level of scrutiny based on the nature of the
classification or the nature of the right affected by the legislation.”). Some state courts,
however, use two levels of scrutiny instead of three. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,
63 (Haw. 1993) (“Whenever a denial of equal protection of the laws is alleged, as a rule our
initial inquiry has been whether the legislation in question should be subjected to ‘strict
scrutiny’ or to a ‘rational basis’ test.” (quoting Nakano v. Matayoshi, 706 P.2d 814, 821
(Haw. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B.,
326 S.W.3d 654, 672 (Tex. App. 2010) (“An equal-protection challenge is examined under
one of two tests: the strict-scrutiny test or the rational-basis test.”).
49
See, e.g., Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Haw. 1978) (“[C]lassifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.” (alteration in original) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50
See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996) (“The sex-based classification in [Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)] § 572–1, on its
face and as applied, is unconstitutional and in violation of the equal protection clause of
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution.”).
51
See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d U.S. v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (“[O]ur conclusion [is] that homosexuals compose a class that is
subject to heightened scrutiny. We further conclude that the class is quasi-suspect (rather
than suspect) based on the weight of the factors and on analogy to the classifications recognized as suspect and quasi-suspect.”); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.
2d 968, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the
appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual
orientation is heightened scrutiny.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009);
(“[W]e hold that legislative classifications based on sexual orientation must be examined
under a heightened level of scrutiny under the Iowa Constitution.”); In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008); (“The strict scrutiny standard therefore is applicable to
statutes that impose differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.”); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
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ing that the right to marry extends to same-sex couples have applied
heightened scrutiny.52
In contrast, the vast majority of courts that have declined to apply
heightened scrutiny in challenges to gender-specific marriage laws
have upheld these laws under rational basis review.53 Indeed, of the
dozens of state and federal opinions upholding prohibitions against
same-sex marriage, all applied rational basis review.54 Several courts
rejecting challenges to restrictive marriage laws have explicitly noted
that the decisions were driven by the extreme deference that rational
basis review requires.55 These courts emphasized that rational basis
review is lax, that “the judiciary does not require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,”56 that “‘it is entirely irrelevant
for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature,’”57 and that rational basis review allows courts to uphold anti-gay marriage bans even
though the stated justifications for the discriminatory laws are not in
sync with their actual operation.58 Under rational basis review, “the
state is not required to show that denying marriage to same-sex
couples is necessary to promote the state’s interest or that same-sex
couples will suffer no harm by an opposite-sex definition of marriage.”59 These decisions are arguably erroneous given their failure to
suggest how denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples in any way
52

Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453; Baker, 744 A.2d at

886.
53
See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006); Conaway
v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 212 (N.J. 2006);
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 980 (Wash. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d
1, 11 (N.Y. 2006); Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 27; Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307
(D.C. 1995).
54
See, e.g., Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1102 (D. Haw. 2012); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (upholding same-sex marriage ban
because no heightened scrutiny applied and rational basis review is very deferential); see
also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 514 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J.,
dissenting) (“I also conclude that our marriage statutes survive rational basis review.”).
55
See, e.g., Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1016 n.6 (D. Nev. 2012) (“The
level of scrutiny is controlled by precedent in this case. Because that level of scrutiny is
rational basis scrutiny, the Court need not examine the parties’ evidence.”); see also Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 37 (Friedlander, J., concurring in result) (emphasizing that the Indiana
court upholding Indiana’s ban on same-sex marriage is not applying heightened scrutiny).
56
Jackson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
57
Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
58
See, e.g., Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 27 (“There was a rational basis for the legislature to
draw the line between opposite-sex couples, who as a generic group are biologically capable of reproducing, and same-sex couples, who are not. This is true, regardless of whether
there are some opposite-sex couples that wish to marry but one or both partners are physically incapable of reproducing.”).
59
Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; id. at 1117 (“Under rational basis
review, the state is not required to show that allowing same-sex couples to marry will discourage, through changing societal norms, opposite-sex couples from marrying. Rather,
the standard is whether the legislature could rationally speculate that it might.”).
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advances a legitimate state interest.60 Nevertheless, these opinions
illustrate how courts have an easier time upholding prohibitions
against same-sex marriage under rational basis review than under
heightened scrutiny.
Several judges have conceded that the choice of the level of scrutiny in same-sex marriage cases is often dispositive. In its opinion
striking down DOMA as unconstitutional under a standard of review it
referred to as “intensified scrutiny,” the First Circuit explicitly acknowledged that the anti-gay law would survive traditional rational basis review.61 While some courts have used rational basis review to
strike down anti-gay marriage restrictions,62 no court has applied
heightened scrutiny and upheld the constitutionality of a genderspecific marriage statute. Judicial decisions on whether same-sex
couples are entitled to enter legally recognized marriages thus turn
on the level of scrutiny applied.63
Proponents of marriage equality have argued that gender-specific
marriage laws should be evaluated under heightened scrutiny. First,
they have argued that laws prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying should be subject to heightened scrutiny because these laws infringe the fundamental right to marry.64 Most courts have rejected
this argument, reasoning that there is no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage.65 Second, marriage equality advocates have argued that marriage bans should be subject to heightened scrutiny because they discriminate based on sexual orientation and based on
60
See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“Because [California’s] Proposition 8 did not further any of these interests, we conclude that they cannot have been rational bases for this
measure, whether or not they are legitimate state interests.”).
61
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir.
2012).
62
See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1094 (invoking the language of “rational basis” and holding of
Romer to affirm district court’s invalidation of California’s Proposition 8); Bishop v. U.S. ex
rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (applying rational basis review to
strike down Oklahoma’s prohibition on same-sex marriage); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1207–11 (D. Utah 2013) (applying rational basis review to strike down
Utah’s prohibition on same-sex marriage); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d
374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (invalidating DOMA using rational basis).
63
See Holning Lau, Formalism: From Racial Integration to Same-Sex Marriage, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 843, 853 (2008) (“Whether a court accepts that same-sex marriage bans amount to sex
discrimination will highly influence a case’s outcome. Existing court opinions support this
prediction. When judges have accepted that same-sex marriage bans amount to sex discrimination, the bans typically have not survived heightened scrutiny.”).
64
See, e.g., Jackson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1094–98; Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 603
(Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 205 (N.J. 2006).
65
See, e.g., Jackson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1098; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 616; Lewis, 908 A.2d
at 211. These courts misconstrue the nature of the fundamental right at issue. The proper
inquiry is not whether there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage but whether there
is a fundamental right to marriage.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-5\CRN502.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 13

23-JUL-14

EMBRACING LOVING

11:40

1089

sex.66 Most courts that have considered the issue have rejected the
argument that sexual orientation is a suspect—or quasi-suspect—classification entitled to heightened scrutiny.67 In contrast, both federal
and state jurisdictions hold that gender is a suspect classification.68
This means that gender-specific marriage laws are subject to heightened scrutiny if judges recognize that prohibitions against same-sex
marriage do, in fact, discriminate on the basis of sex. Most courts,
however, have concluded that gender-specific marriage laws do not
discriminate based on gender.69 Part Two explains why these courts
are mistaken.
II
GENDER-SPECIFIC MARRIAGE LAWS

AS

SEX DISCRIMINATION

State laws prohibiting same-sex marriage have survived most
equal protection challenges. The resilience of marriage bans is
largely a function of the level of scrutiny applied by the courts in deciding challenges to these bans. Marriage bans have always failed
when the court has applied heightened scrutiny but have generally
survived when the court applies rational basis review.70 This Article
focuses on the argument that gender-specific marriage laws discriminate based on sex and thus heightened scrutiny is required.
A. The Basic Case: Marriage Inequality as Sex Discrimination
Scholars and lawyers have long argued that discrimination based
on sexual orientation is a subset of sex discrimination.71 Many
66

See, e.g., Jackson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1100; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 602–03.
See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571
(9th Cir. 1990). Cf. Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 377 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (concluding that sexual orientation is a suspect classification and that Montana’s
refusal to extend marriage-like rights to same-sex couples violates Montana’s Equal Protection Clause).
68
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (“[C]lassifications based
upon sex . . . are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny.”); Conaway, 932 A.2d. at 673 (noting that under the Maryland constitution, classifications based on gender are suspect).
69
Jackson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (“[T]he vast majority of courts considering the
issue [have held] that an opposite-sex definition of marriage does not constitute gender
discrimination.”).
70
See supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text.
71
See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 83 (2010); Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument In
Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 397, 397 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination
Against Lesbians And Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 199 (1994)
(“[D]iscrimination against lesbians and gay men reinforces the hierarchy of males over
females and thus is wrong because it oppresses women.”); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy:
Perez v. Sharp, Anti-Miscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
839, 839–40 (2008); Josephine Ross, Riddle For Our Times: The Continued Refusal to Apply the
Miscegenation Analogy to Same-Sex Marriage, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 999, 1002 (2002); Mark
67

R
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anti-gay laws have their roots in gender discrimination and gender
stereotyping. For example, gender-specific sodomy laws represented a
form of sex discrimination by permitting men to perform cunnilingus
but criminalizing that same conduct by women.72 With respect to gender stereotyping, some courts in employment cases have found that,
under some circumstances, hostile actions against a gay employee can
violate Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination based on sex.73
In the case of gender-specific marriage laws, the claim of sex discrimination is straightforward. Step One of equal protection analysis
asks whether a challenged law classifies people along a particular trait.
By definition, gender-specific marriage laws classify people based on
their gender and then restrict the ability to marry based on their partners’ respective genders. That is the essence of sex discrimination.74
This does not answer the ultimate constitutional question because
some sex-discriminatory laws do not violate Equal Protection, but
these laws must survive heightened scrutiny.75 In the context of marriage equality for same-sex couples, however, courts have been generally unreceptive to the argument that gender-specific marriage laws

Strasser, Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 PEPP. L. REV.
1021, 1033 (2011); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 462
(2007); Jeffrey A. Williams, Re-Orienting the Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay Rights After
Lawrence v. Texas, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 131, 133 (2005). But see J.M. Balkin, The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2362 (1997) (arguing that “[h]omosexuals have
low status because they transgress a set of social meanings about gender that define heterosexuality.”); Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay
Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 474 (2001) (objecting that such an argument is “sociologically, theoretically, and morally flawed”).
72
Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98
YALE L.J. 145, 151 n.43 (1988); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 111 (2000) (noting
that even facially gender-neutral sodomy laws operated as though they were genderspecific).
73
See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously found that
“same-sex gender stereotyping . . . [,] i.e., gender stereotyping of a male gay employee by
his male co-workers,” constituted actionable harassment under Title VII and concluding
that “[t]he repeated testimony that his co-workers treated [the plaintiff], in a variety of
ways, ‘like a woman’ constitutes ample evidence of gender stereotyping”); see also Centola v.
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he line between discrimination
because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of sex is hardly clear.”).
74
See Clark, supra note 13, at 140 (“If discrimination against different-race couples is
race discrimination, and discrimination against different-religion couples is religious discrimination, and discrimination against different-age couples is age discrimination, . . .
then discrimination against same-sex couples must be sex discrimination. The logical extension is irresistible.”).
75
See, e.g., Rucker v. City of Kettering, 84 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(denying preliminary injunction because city policy of hiring only male jail attendants to
guard male prisoners was determined likely to survive heightened scrutiny).

R
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discriminate based on sex and therefore require heightened
scrutiny.76
The earliest attempts to challenge prohibitions on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional failed miserably. Gay Americans began litigating for the right to marry in the 1970s. In Baker v. Nelson,77 the
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected out of hand a male couple’s argument that prohibiting them from obtaining a marriage license violated the Fourteenth Amendment.78 The Supreme Court dismissed
their appeal “for want of a substantial federal question.”79 Soon after,
a male couple in Washington state sued to obtain a marriage license.
In Singer v. Hara,80 the Singer court reasoned that the male couple was
not being discriminated against based on sex because the two would
have been similarly denied a marriage license if they had been a
female couple.81
Courts thus seemed an unlikely avenue to secure marriage rights
until the Hawaii Supreme Court entered the fray in 1993. Same-sex
couples in the fiftieth state challenged Hawaii’s refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage. In Baehr v. Lewin,82 the Hawaii Supreme Court
noted that “sex is a ‘suspect category’ for purposes of equal protection
analysis under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution and that
[the state statute not recognizing same-sex marriage] is subject to the
‘strict scrutiny’ test.”83 The court next held that a same-sex marriage
ban necessarily classifies people based on sex and makes rights dependent on an individual’s sex. Consequently, the state marriage law
“(1) . . . is presumed to be unconstitutional (2) unless . . . the State of
Hawaii can show that (a) the statute’s sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples’ constitutional rights.”84 The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case in
order to afford the state the opportunity to show that the ban on
same-sex marriage could survive strict scrutiny.85 On remand, the trial
court held that refusal to recognize marriages between same-sex
76

See infra note 91.
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
78
Id. at 187.
79
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).
80
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
81
Id. at 1191 (“In other words, the state suggests that appellants are not entitled to
relief under the [Equal Rights Amendment] because they have failed to make a showing
that they are somehow being treated differently by the state than they would be if they were
females.”).
82
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
83
Id. at 67. The Hawaii Supreme Court did not hold that sexual orientation was a
suspect classification. Id. at 67 n.33.
84
Id. at 67.
85
Id. at 68 (“On remand, in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard, the burden
will rest on Lewin to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572–1 is unconstitutional by
77

R
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couples violated the equal protection provision of the Hawaiian Constitution, but the court stayed implementation of its decision until review by the Hawaii Supreme Court.86 Before that review could occur,
the people of Hawaii amended their state constitution to prohibit
same-sex marriage while the state legislature created a system of reciprocal benefits through which same-sex couples could acquire many of
the rights enjoyed by married heterosexual couples.87
The Hawaii Supreme Court’s recognition that the state’s ban on
same-sex marriage was a sex-based classification ignited discussion
over same-sex marriage in America. It provided a glimmer of hope
for same-sex couples that their country, or at least their state, might
recognize their relationships in their lifetimes. Unfortunately, the
Baehr decision also generated a great deal of backlash against gay
couples, most notably the congressional passage of DOMA, which provided, among other things, that the federal government would refuse
to recognize valid state marriages between same-sex couples.88 Dozens of states followed suit, enacting their own mini-DOMAs, often by
amending their state constitutions.89
The Hawaii decision also encouraged constitutional challenges to
same-sex marriage prohibitions. Since the Baehr opinion, more samesex couples have invoked gender-based arguments to challenge the
constitutionality of state bans on same-sex marriage.90 The argument
has received a muted reception. Most courts have rejected the argument that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on account of sex and
have declined to apply heightened scrutiny on that basis.91
Yet even when the sex discrimination argument against same-sex
marriage bans does not generate a majority opinion, as it did in the
Hawaii Supreme Court, the argument has nevertheless gained tracdemonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights.” (citations omitted)).
86
See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1075 (D. Haw. 2012).
87
Id. at 1072 (“In 1997, the legislature extended certain rights to same-sex couples
through the creation of reciprocal-beneficiary relationships. In 2011, the legislature
passed a civil unions law, conferring all of the state legal rights and benefits of marriage
(except the title marriage) on same-sex couples who enter into a civil union.”).
88
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
89
See Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 375 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“In
the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin . . . , which held that
denying same-sex couples the ability to marry must be justified under ‘strict scrutiny’ principles, measures were proposed and adopted in as many as 30 states, including Montana,
purporting to limit marriage to one man and one woman.”); id. at 373 (Rice, J., concurring) (“To counter this threat to established precedent favoring marriage, citizens of some
31 states acted to either reinstate the law’s exclusive definition and treatment of marriage
in some manner, or to ensure that courts could not eliminate such exclusive treatment, by
amending their state constitutions to explicitly protect marriage.”).
90
See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 309 (D.C. 1995).
91
See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (collecting cases); Jackson,
884 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99 (same).
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tion among some jurists, both in concurring and dissenting opinions.
For example, in Baker v. State,92 the Vermont Supreme Court broke
new ground in holding that the state cannot deny same-sex couples
the rights and benefits associated with marriage afforded to oppositesex couples.93 The opinion led to the creation of civil unions, an institution that afforded same-sex couples the rights and benefits of marriage while denying same-sex couples the use of the word
“marriage.”94 Although the Baker majority rejected the argument that
Vermont’s prohibition of same-sex marriage constituted sex discrimination,95 in a partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Denise R.
Johnson of the Vermont Supreme Court had little trouble concluding
that “marriage statutes establish a classification based on sex.”96 The
justice asked readers to
consider the following example. Dr. A and Dr. B both want to
marry Ms. C, an X-ray technician. Dr. A may do so because Dr. A is
a man. Dr. B may not because Dr. B is a woman. Dr. A and Dr. B
are people of opposite sexes who are similarly situated in the sense
that they both want to marry a person of their choice. The statute
disqualifies Dr. B from marriage solely on the basis of her sex and
treats her differently from Dr. A, a man. This is sex discrimination.97

Justice Johnson’s hypothetical illustrates the point that same-sex marriage bans require the state to inquire into an individual’s gender in
order to determine whether that person is entitled to a right that one
gender has and the other does not.98 This is the hallmark of a
gender-based classification.99
The sex discrimination argument played a minor role when the
Massachusetts Supreme Court made legal history by becoming the
92

744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
Id. at 886.
94
See generally DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE (2004)
(presenting a historical narrative of the events leading up to the passage of Vermont’s civil
unions law and the surrounding debate). Vermont later adopted same-sex marriage
through legislative action. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010).
95
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
96
Id. at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97
Id. at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“The relevant portion
of Indiana’s DOMA at issue today states: ‘Only a female may marry a male. Only a male
may marry a female.’”).
99
The Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), considered an equal protection
challenge to an Idaho statute providing that, when two individuals are otherwise equally
qualified to serve as the administrator of an estate, the male applicant must be preferred to
the female. Id. at 73. The Court explained that the Idaho statute “provides that different
treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a
classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 75. Similarly,
marriage laws provide different treatment based on sex and therefore create a sex-based
classification.
93
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first state supreme court to hold that, under that state’s constitution,
same-sex couples were entitled to marriage—both the bundle of
rights and the word itself.100 In Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health,101 the court held that Massachusetts’ marriage law unconstitutionally discriminated based on sexual orientation, though not gender.102 One justice in the Goodridge majority, however, would have
held that the ban on same-sex marriage also constituted impermissible sex discrimination. Justice John M. Greaney in his concurrence
explained:
Because our marriage statutes intend, and state, the ordinary understanding that marriage under our law consists only of a union between a man and a woman, they create a statutory classification
based on the sex of the two people who wish to marry. That the
classification is sex based is self-evident. The marriage statutes prohibit some applicants, such as the plaintiffs, from obtaining a marriage license, and that prohibition is based solely on the applicants’
gender. As a factual matter, an individual’s choice of marital partner is constrained because of his or her own sex. Stated in particular terms, Hillary Goodridge cannot marry Julie Goodridge because
she (Hillary) is a woman. Likewise, Gary Chalmers cannot marry
Richard Linnell because he (Gary) is a man. Only their gender prevents Hillary and Gary from marrying their chosen partners under
the present law.103

Even in those cases where state supreme courts have held that
same-sex marriage bans do not violate the state’s constitution, the sex
discrimination arguments for heightened scrutiny have been
powerfully advanced in dissenting opinions. For example, in his dissenting opinion from the Washington Supreme Court’s decision to
uphold that state’s then-prohibition on same-sex marriage,104 Justice
Bobbe J. Bridge argued that the state law violated the state
constitution:
[The state law] discriminates on the basis of sex. A woman cannot
marry the woman of her choice but a man can marry the woman of
his choice. In other words, the only thing preventing plaintiff
Heather Andersen from marrying her partner, Leslie Christian, is
the fact that Andersen is a woman. Andersen should no more read-

100
See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Heterosexual Words (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
101
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
102
Id. at 968.
103
Id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
104
Following their state supreme court’s refusal to recognize marriages between samesex couples, the voters of Washington state adopted marriage equality in the November
2012 election. See Gay Marriage Approved by Wash. Voters, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2012, at A12.
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ily be prohibited from marrying her partner than she is from voting
for president or practicing law.105

Similarly, Judge Lynne A. Battaglia of the Maryland Supreme Court
dissented from that court’s opinion to uphold the then in force state
prohibition on same-sex marriage.106 The judge concluded that the
law was a form of sex discrimination because “[o]nly by virtue of a
person’s sex is he or she prohibited from marrying a person of the
same sex.”107
Recognizing that prohibitions of same-sex marriage represent a
form of sex discrimination is important because this would subject
state marriage bans to heightened scrutiny in both state and federal
courts.108 The level of scrutiny is potentially dispositive when analyzing the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans because rational
basis review is so deferential that this often leads to the bans being
upheld as constitutional due primarily to judicial deference even absent any compelling reason to discriminate against same-sex
couples.109 In her dissent, Judge Battaglia suggested that same-sex
marriage bans have endured, in large part, because state courts have
applied rational basis review and not heightened scrutiny.110 Similarly, the chief justice of the Maryland Supreme Court observed that
105

Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1037 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting).
As in Washington state, the voters of Maryland subsequently voted to recognize
marriages between same-sex couples in the November 2012 election.
107
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 685 (Md. 2007) (Battaglia, J., dissenting). See id.
at 686 (“Thus, a man who wishes to marry another man is prevented from choosing his
marriage partner purely on the basis of sex; likewise, a woman who wishes to marry another
woman is prevented from choosing her marriage partner purely on the basis of sex.”).
Justice Battaglia found the dissent in the Washington case persuasive. Id. at 678–79 (“The
Washington same-sex marriage prohibition did classify on grounds of sex, because a homosexual was permitted to marry a partner of the opposite sex, but was prohibited from marrying
a partner of the same sex.”).
108
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 907 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Although Vermont has not had occasion to consider the question,
most, if not all, courts have held that the denial of rights or benefits on the basis of sex
subject the state’s action to some level of heightened scrutiny.”). The trailblazing opinions
of Baker and Goodridge illustrate that significant gains have been made for marriage equality
even without the sex discrimination argument carrying the day. The Vermont Supreme
Court recognized that its state constitution required that same-sex couples be afforded the
rights and benefits of marriage, albeit without the name. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that its state constitution precluded the government from excluding same-sex
couples from the institution of marriage. This may suggest that the sex discrimination
argument is unnecessary to achieve marriage equality. While that was true in Vermont and
Massachusetts, the results in other states reveal the importance of the level of scrutiny
applied.
109
See supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text.
110
See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 692 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (arguing, for example, that
the state’s interest in “promoting marriage between opposite-sex couples because . . .
same-sex couples cannot reproduce without extensive, expensive outside intervention . . .
has been upheld only under rational basis scrutiny” (emphasis added)).
106
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same-sex marriage prohibitions would not survive constitutional analysis if they were subject to heightened scrutiny.111
B. The “Equal Application” of Gender-Specific Marriage Laws
Most courts have rejected the proposition that prohibitions on
same-sex marriage constitute a form of sex discrimination and have
declined to apply heightened scrutiny on that basis.112 For over forty
years, courts bent on upholding same-sex marriage bans have proclaimed that this form of gender-specific law neither classifies nor
discriminates based on sex.113 Judges have reasoned that such prohibitions do not discriminate on account of sex because the laws apply
equally to both men and women, and thus heightened scrutiny is not
required on this basis.114 For example, the Washington Supreme
Court held that its state prohibition on same-sex marriage “treats both
sexes the same; neither a man nor a woman may marry a person of the
same sex.”115 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals concluded
that “[w]omen and men are treated alike—they are permitted to
111

See id. at 697 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 586 (“When considering those cases in context, however, and because
we believe that Article 46 was not intended by the General Assembly and the Maryland
voters who enacted and ratified, respectively, the Maryland [Equal Rights Amendment] in
1972 to reach classifications based on sexual orientation, we conclude that Family Law
§ 2–201 does not draw an impermissible sex-based distinction.” (emphasis in original));
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (“By limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples, New York is not engaging in sex discrimination.”); Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13
(“[W]e do not doubt that a statute that discriminated on the basis of sex would bear a
heavy burden . . . . Here, there is no discrete class subject to differential treatment solely
on the basis of sex; each sex is equally prohibited from precisely the same conduct.”).
113
The argument that prohibitions on same-sex marriage treat men and women
equally was also made in defense of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) during the 1970s
debate over whether to amend the U.S. Constitution to guarantee gender equality. The
Supreme Court of Maryland noted,
Speaking directly on the point of the proposed amendment and its effects
on marriage between members of the same sex, it was contended by Senator Birch Evans Bayh II (Dem., Indiana) during the Senate debate that
‘[t]he equal rights amendment would not prohibit a State from saying that
the institution of marriage would be prohibited to men partners. It would
not prohibit a State from saying the institution of marriage would be prohibited to women partners. All it says is that if a State legislature makes a
judgment that it is wrong for a man to marry a man, then it must say it is
wrong for a woman to marry a woman-or if a State says it is wrong for a
woman to marry a woman, then it must say that it is wrong for a man to
marry a man.’ 118 Congr. Rec. 9331 (daily ed. 21 March 1972) (statements
of Sen. Bayh).
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 591. The rhetoric of the ERA era serves as the legal precedent but
shows the longevity of the self-contradictory argument that a law that establishes a sexual
classification and assigns ability to engage in particular conduct based on gender does not
constitute sex discrimination.
114
See Clark, supra note 13, at 120–23.
115
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006); see also Conaway, 932 A.2d
at 598 (“[T]he statute prohibits equally both men and women from the same conduct.”);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 974 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissent112
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marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their own sex.”116
Even the majority in Baker, the first state supreme court case to grant
substantive marriage-like rights to same-sex couples, posited that
same-sex marriage bans “do not discriminate on the basis of sex because they treat similarly situated males the same as similarly situated
females.”117
In asserting that same-sex marriage bans should not receive
heightened scrutiny because they do not discriminate based on sex,
courts advance two connected propositions related to classification
and benefits. First, judges boldly declare that a gender-specific law
ing) (arguing that the Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage “creates no distinction
between the sexes, but applies to men and women in precisely the same way”).
116
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–11; see also Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d
1065, 1071 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is also subject to rational
basis review. Hawaii’s marriage laws do not treat males and females differently as a class;
consequently, the laws do not discriminate on the basis of gender.”); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1307–08 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“DOMA does not discriminate on the basis of
sex because it treats women and men equally.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 507 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting) (“This statute does not differentiate
between the genders because both men and women are equally barred from marrying a
person of the same sex. Thus, so long as the civil union statute treats both genders equally
in prohibiting both from entering a same sex marriage, it does not run afoul of the constitutional provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex.”); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 71 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting) (“HRS § 572–1 treats everyone alike and applies
equally to both sexes. The effect of the statute is to prohibit same sex marriages on the
part of professed or non-professed heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals, or asexuals, and
does not effect an invidious discrimination.”).
117
Baker, 744 A.2d at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority opinion on this point); see also Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d
1252, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (asserting that Oklahoma’s ban on same-sex marriage “does
not draw any distinctions between same-sex male couples and same-sex female couples,”
though ultimately invalidating ban under rational basis review).
Other courts have employed this same reasoning to deny equal treatment of same-sex
couples in situations short of marriage. For example, in Phillips v. Wis. Personnel Comm’n,
482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), a lesbian couple sued for gender discrimination
because the state health plan denied medical coverage to the plaintiff’s partner because
the definition of “dependent” was limited to legal spouses or children. Id. at 124. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected her claim, reasoning that “dependent insurance coverage is unavailable to unmarried companions of both male and female employees. A
statute is only subject to a challenge for gender discrimination under the equal protection
clause when it discriminates on its face, or in effect, between males and females.” Id. at 129
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Similarly, before the U.S. Supreme Court held sodomy laws to be unconstitutional, the
Missouri Supreme Court used the “equal application” argument to reject a sex-based equal
protection claim to that state’s sodomy statute:
The State concedes that the statute prohibits men from doing what women
may do, namely, engage in sexual activity with men. However, the State
argues that it likewise prohibits women from doing something which men
can do: engage in sexual activity with women. We believe it applies equally
to men and women because it prohibits both classes from engaging in sexual activity with members of their own sex. Thus, there is no denial of
equal protection on that basis.
State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
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that renders a couple’s legal ability to marry a function of the individuals’ genders “does not draw any classifications based on sex.”118
After the Washington appellate court in Singer held that genderrestrictive marriage laws did not engage in “sexual classification,”119
many courts have followed suit. For example, analyzing a challenge to
the federal DOMA, a bankruptcy court concluded that “the marriage
definition contained in DOMA does not classify according to gender.”120 The court concluded this despite the fact that the law specifically made marriage a function of the gender of the parties.121 Even
the otherwise supportive Vermont Supreme Court wrote, “[t]he difficulty here is that the marriage laws are facially neutral; they do not
single out men or women as a class for disparate treatment, but rather
prohibit men and women equally from marrying a person of the same
sex.”122 Similarly, the dissent in Hawaii’s Baehr decision asserted that
the challenged “statute treats everyone alike and applies equally to
both sexes.”123
Second, courts assert that under a regime of gender-specific
marriage laws, the provision of benefits is not based on sex. For example, in its 2006 Andersen opinion, the Washington Supreme
Court reasoned that the state’s gender-restrictive marriage law
did “not render benefits to just one sex, nor does it restrict or
deny rights of one sex.”124 Consequently, judges assert that there

118
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006); id. at 988 (“Men and
women are treated identically under DOMA; neither may marry a person of the same sex.
DOMA therefore does not make any ‘classification by sex,’ and it does not discriminate on
account of sex.” (citing Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974))); Conaway, 932 A.2d at 599 (“Because there is no ‘discrete class subject to differential treatment,’
according to the court’s analysis, the prohibition on same-sex marriage did not draw a sexbased classification.”).
119
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1192 (“There is no analogous sexual classification involved in
the instant case because appellants are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one that may be entered
into only by two persons who are members of the opposite sex.”).
120
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
121
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman.”).
122
Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
123
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 71 n.3 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting).
124
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006); see also Conaway v. Deane,
932 A.2d 571, 598 (Md. 2007) (“Nor does the statute, facially or in its application, place
men and women on an uneven playing field.”); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting)
(“HRS § 572–1 does not establish a ‘suspect’ classification based on gender because all
males and females are treated alike. A male cannot obtain a license to marry another
male, and a female cannot obtain a license to marry another female. Neither sex is being
granted a right or benefit the other does not have, and neither sex is being denied a right or
benefit that the other has.”).
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is no gender discrimination and no need for heightened scrutiny.125
Finally, some courts explicitly link these two contentions. For example, the New York Court of Appeals asserted that the state ban on
same-sex marriage did “not put men and women in different classes,
and give one class a benefit not given to the other.”126 All of these
arguments are versions of “equal application” theory.
C. Loving, Race Discrimination, and “Equal Application” Theory
The argument that gender-specific marriage laws should not receive heightened scrutiny, since they do not discriminate based on
gender because they apply equally to men and women, has a facial
grammatical simplicity. In decades past, the attraction of such an argument was not lost on supporters of miscegenation laws.127 The opponents of marriage equality have essentially recycled the “equal
application” argument from lawyers who defended state laws that
voided interracial marriages and criminalized interracial sexual relations.128 This section explores how the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the “equal application” argument and applied heightened
scrutiny in miscegenation cases.
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of miscegenation-related laws in the late 1800s. In 1883’s Pace v. Alabama,129
the Justices considered whether an Alabama criminal law that affixed
a greater punishment for interracial adultery than same-race adultery
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In upholding the Alabama statute, the Supreme Court adopted the
125
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 19 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring) (“The precedent establishes that gender discrimination occurs when men and women are not treated equally and one gender is benefitted or burdened as opposed to the
other.”); id. at 20 (“[N]either men nor women are disproportionately disadvantaged or
burdened by the fact that New York’s Domestic Relations Law allows only opposite-sex
couples to marry—both genders are treated precisely the same way. As such, there is no
gender classification triggering intermediate scrutiny.”).
126
Id. at 10; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 598 (“The limitations on marriage effected by Family
Law § 2–201 [the Maryland law that prohibited same-sex marriage] do not separate men
and women into discrete classes for the purpose of granting to one class of persons benefits at the expense of the other class.”).
127
NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 100 (2000)
(“Most often, supporters argued that the federal civil rights legislation would not touch
antimiscegenation laws because the laws constrained whites and blacks equally. A black
person could not marry a white; but neither could a white marry a black.”) (citing Steven
A. Bank, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of Symmetry: The Understanding of Equality in
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303, 319–23 (1995) (calling this
usual justification the doctrine of “symmetrical equality”)).
128
Hunter, supra note 71, at 401–02. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 19–20
(Graffeo, J., concurring) (asserting that New York’s Domestic Relations Law burdens both
sexes equally).
129
106 U.S. 583 (1883).
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“races are treated equally” argument. Justice Stephen Johnson Field
opined that the statutory scheme did not impose
any discrimination against either race. [The Alabama criminal
code] equally includes the offence when the persons of the two
sexes are both white and when they are both black . . . [and] applies
the same punishment to both offenders, the white and the black.
Indeed, the offence against which this latter section is aimed cannot
be committed without involving the persons of both races in the
same punishment. Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the offence
designated and not against the person of any particular color or
race. The punishment of each offending person, whether white or
black, is the same.130

The Pace opinion was seen as validating all state miscegenation laws.131
The United States Supreme Court’s position was in line with several
state supreme courts that had previously invoked the equal application theory to uphold their miscegenation laws against constitutional
attack.132 As long as state laws against interracial marriage, fornication, and cohabitation applied to, and punished, equally the white
and the black participant, Pace and its state court counterparts held
that these race-specific laws did not discriminate based on race and,
thus, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. While the opinion
proved controversial,133 the Supreme Court waited over 80 years to

130

Id. at 585.
See, e.g., PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 269 (2009) (“Every southern court that upheld its state miscegenation law—the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1955, the Supreme Court of Louisiana in
1959, and the Supreme Court of Florida in 1963—had cited Pace in doing so.” (citing
McLaughlin v. State, 153 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1963); State v. Brown, 108 So. 2d 233, 234 (La.
1959); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E. 2d 749, 754 (Va. 1955))); Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49, 49 (1964) (referring to Pace
as “the only precedent that has been consistently cited by courts in upholding these [miscegenation] statutes”)).
132
See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 177 (1883) (“The act in question is not open
to the objection that it discriminates against the colored race, because it equally forbids
white persons from intermarrying with negroes, and prescribes the same punishment for
violations of its provisions by white as by colored persons.”); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195
(1877) (“[S]urely there can not be any tyranny or injustice in requiring both alike, to form
this union with those of their own race only.”); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 299 (1871)
(“If the males of one race had the right to appropriate the females of the other, while that
right was denied to the males of the other race, there might be some foundation for the
charge of discrimination.”); State v. Hairston, 63 N.C. 439, 440 (1869) (“[T]he intermarriage of whites and blacks is against public policy, and is unlawful. . . . It is no discrimination in favor of one race against the other, but applies equally to both.”).
133
See John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW. L.J.
15, 36 (2007) (“Pace wreaked much havoc in lower courts.”).
131
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repudiate its holding in Pace, and in the meantime, state courts followed this approach to upholding miscegenation statutes.134
In 1964, in McLaughlin v. Florida,135 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Florida statute that punished by imprisonment “‘[a]ny negro man and white woman, or any white man and
negro woman, who are not married to each other, who shall habitually
live in and occupy in the nighttime the same room.’”136 The Florida
Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the statute based
on the authority of Pace.137 Before the Supreme Court, the State of
Florida again argued that because the law applied equally to white
people and black people, it did not constitute racial discrimination.138
The Justices acknowledged the “equal application” theory accepted in
Pace, observing that the 1883 Court had held that “the Alabama law
regulating the conduct of both Negroes and whites satisfied the Equal
Protection Clause since it applied equally to and among the members of
the class . . . . Because each of the Alabama laws applied equally to
those to whom it was applicable, the different treatment accorded interracial and intraracial couples was irrelevant.”139 The McLaughlin
Court also conceded that the Florida law entailed equal application
across races to the extent that “all whites and Negroes who engage in
the forbidden conduct are covered by the section and each member
of the interracial couple is subject to the same penalty.”140 The Justices, however, looked beyond the facile “equal application” argument
and noted that the Florida law “treats the interracial couple made up
of a white person and a Negro differently than it does any other
couple.”141 The Justices repudiated the Pace opinion, noting that it
“represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has
not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.”142
The Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny—because the
Florida statute classified and punished the members of a couple based
on their race—and held that the law violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.143 Although the State of Flor134
See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Denver, 124 P.2d 240, 241 (Colo. 1942) (“There is here
no question of race discrimination. The statute applies to both white and black.”); In re
Paquet’s Estate, 200 P. 911, 913 (Or. 1921) (“It will be noted that the statute does not
discriminate. It applies alike to all persons, either white, negroes, Chinese, Kanaka, or
Indians.”).
135
379 U.S. 184 (1964).
136
Id. at 184 (quoting section 798.05 of the Florida statutes, F.S.A.).
137
Id. at 187 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)).
138
Id. at 187–88.
139
Id. at 189–90 (emphasis added).
140
Id. at 188.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 191–94.
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ida attempted to justify its race-based anti-cohabitation law as ancillary
to its miscegenation law, the Supreme Court rejected this argument
while declining to “reach[ ] the question of the validity of the State’s
prohibition against interracial marriage.”144
After it dodged the broader issue in McLaughlin, the Court addressed the constitutionality of miscegenation laws three years later in
Loving v. Virginia.145 When the State of Virginia convicted Richard
and Mildred Loving of violating that state’s miscegenation statute, the
couple challenged the law as violating the Equal Protection Clause.146
The Virginia courts upheld the law as constitutional.147 In front of
the United States Supreme Court, the State of Virginia argued that its
miscegenation regime did not discriminate based on race because “its
miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro
participants in an interracial marriage.”148 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren “reject[ed] the notion that the mere
‘equal application’ of a statute containing racial classifications is
enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial discriminations.”149 The
fact that the challenged law made the exercise of rights a function of
an individual’s race meant that the law was subject to strict scrutiny,
regardless of whether this racial restriction “appl[ied] equally” to all
races.150 The Loving Court invoked its earlier opinion in McLaughlin,
noting that it had “rejected the proposition that . . . the requirement
of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished.”151 Thus, with
respect to Step One of equal protection analysis, the Court rejected
the “equal application” theory and concluded that miscegenation laws
represented a racial classification and were thus subject to strict scru-

144

Id. at 195.
388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
146
Id. at 2–4.
147
Id. at 3–4.
148
Id. at 8; see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 601 (Md. 2007) (“In Loving, the
issue before the Court was the constitutionality of a Virginia statutory scheme prohibiting
marriage between non-Caucasians and Caucasians, and providing for criminal penalties for
violations. In support of the statute, the State of Virginia argued that, even though reference was made to race in determining who was entitled to marry, it punished equally both
participants in the interracial marriage.”).
149
Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
150
Id. at 8, 11.
151
Id. at 10 (citing McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
145

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-5\CRN502.txt

2014]

unknown

EMBRACING LOVING

Seq: 27

23-JUL-14

11:40

1103

tiny.152 The court then proceeded to Step Three and concluded that
miscegenation laws failed strict scrutiny.153
In short, the Loving Court explicitly held that if a law determines
what people may do based on a particular trait, then that law classifies
people based on that trait. This is consistent with the Court’s opinion
in McLaughlin, which too “stands for the proposition (which should be
obvious even without judicial support) that if a statute defines prohibited conduct by reference to a characteristic, then the statute is not
neutral with respect to that characteristic.”154
Not surprisingly, judges who have rejected the “equal application” argument in the Step One analysis—and found gender-specific
marriage laws to represent sex-based classifications subject to heightened scrutiny—have invoked Loving.155 For example, the dissent in
the Maryland case noted that a gender-specific marriage law “classifies
on the basis of sex . . . . Just as in Loving, it is the nature of the classifications themselves that implicates strict scrutiny.”156 While Loving would
seem to preclude acceptance of the equal application theory, Part III
examines how courts have evaded Loving’s holding.

152

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12 (“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.”).
154
Koppelman, supra note 72, at 151; see also Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex
Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV.
519, 523 (2001) [hereinafter Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument] (citing
McLaughlin as an example of a racial classification being sufficient to merit heightened
scrutiny, regardless of legislative motive or proof of harm).
155
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“Instead, the Loving court held that ‘[t]here can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race [where the] statutes
proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races.’” (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11)); see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 685 (Md. 2007)
(Battaglia, J., dissenting) (“Loving involved the State assertion of an analogous allegedly
neutral, generally applicable statute prohibiting miscegenation. . . . The Court applied
strict scrutiny to the Virginia statute despite its ostensibly equal application to both
races.”).
156
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 686 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Similarly, in challenging Washington state’s then-prohibition against same-sex marriage, the plaintiffs relied on that
state’s equal rights amendment, which provides: “Equality of rights and responsibility
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.” Wash. Const. art. XXXI,
§ 1. While the Washington Supreme Court’s prevailing plurality and concurrence accepted the “equal application” theory in holding that gender-specific marriage laws did not
discriminate based on sex, the dissent noted that “this equal application theory, as applied
to the institution of marriage, has already been rejected by the United States Supreme
Court in Loving.” Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1038 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J.,
dissenting).
153
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III
THE FLAWED EFFORTS

TO

DISTINGUISH LOVING

Because Loving repudiated the equal application theory when
evaluating Step One of an equal protection claim, judges who are determined to evade heightened scrutiny based on gender have sought
to distinguish Loving. Indeed, almost every court to reject the sex discrimination argument for heightened scrutiny of gender-specific marriage laws has asserted that Loving is “inapt,”157 “inapposite,”158 or
“not analogous,”159 such that any “reliance [on Loving] is misplaced.”160 In their attempts to distinguish Loving, courts have advanced several related arguments. This Part discusses each of these
arguments and explains why they are incorrect.161
A. Discriminatory Intent: Confusing Classification with Analysis
The primary argument that courts use to distinguish Loving is
that the 1967 opinion is concerned solely with white supremacy and,
therefore, is irrelevant to determining whether heightened scrutiny is
appropriate because gender-specific marriage laws classify people
based on sex. These courts suggest that the only reason that the
157

Conaway, 932 A.2d at 599–600.
Id. at 601.
159
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989.
160
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (Vt. 1999); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384, 437 (Cal. 2008) (stating that Loving is “clearly distinguishable”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 503 n.26 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Loving case and a case challenging gender-specific marriage laws “are in no way
similar”).
161
Some attempts to distinguish Loving are transparently frail. Several courts have
held that the holdings of Loving are inapplicable to equal protection challenges to genderspecific marriage laws because Loving did not involve a same-sex couple. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1097 (D. Haw. 2012) (stating that Loving “did not
involve expanding the traditional definition of marriage as being between a man and a
woman” and that “[t]his case presents a different right, the right to marry someone of the
same sex”); see also Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 210 (N.J. 2006) (“We add that all of the
United States Supreme Court cases cited by plaintiffs, Loving, Turner, and Zablocki, involved
heterosexual couples seeking access to the right to marriage and did not implicate directly
the primary question to be answered in this case.”). For example, in his dissent in Baehr,
Hawaiian Supreme Court Justice Heen argued that Loving was distinguishable because “the
plaintiff in Loving was not claiming a right to a same sex marriage.” Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 70 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting). Justice Heen’s reasoning betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of how constitutional law works. Published opinions stand for
legal principles that are applied to future litigants in cases involving different fact patterns.
The Supreme Court has explicitly cautioned against courts refusing to recognize the rights
of gay Americans by declining to apply the holdings of cases not involving gay individuals.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–67 (2003). The Loving Court unanimously held that
if the marriage law is trait specific, then it classifies people based on that trait and, consequently, heightened scrutiny applies if classification on the basis of that trait is suspect.
The fact that Richard and Mildred Loving were of opposite genders is irrelevant to the
Loving Court’s unqualified rejection of equal application theory. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
158
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Loving Court rejected the equal application theory was because the
challenged statute sought to perpetuate white supremacy.162 For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held that its gender-specific marriage law did not classify based on gender, distinguishing Loving
because “the high court [in Loving] had little difficulty in looking behind the superficial neutrality of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute
to hold that its real purpose was to maintain the pernicious doctrine
of white supremacy.”163 Those judges determined to distinguish Loving asserted that the miscegenation law in that case was subject to
strict scrutiny because the law had a discriminatory—anti-black—purpose.164 To date, the state supreme courts of California, Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, Washington, and Maryland—as well as
various lower-level state and federal courts—have distinguished Loving
in order to hold that gender-specific marriage laws do not receive
heightened scrutiny based on sex discrimination because the purpose
of miscegenation laws was to perpetuate white supremacy.165
Several of these courts gave particular weight to the fact that the
Virginia miscegenation statute focused solely on interracial marriages
where either the bride or groom was white. These courts highlighted
the fact that the Loving Court noted in a footnote that “‘[w]hile Virginia prohibits whites from marrying any nonwhite . . . , Negroes,
Orientals, and any other racial class may intermarry without statutory
interference.’”166 This suggested an overarching desire by legislators
to “protect” the white race without regard to interracial marriage
among nonwhite participants.167 For example, the California Su162
See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 601 (“[T]he Court in Loving determined that, although
the statute applied on its face equally to all races, the underlying purpose was to sustain
White Supremacy and to subordinate African-Americans and other non-Caucasians as a
class.”).
163
Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
164
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 992 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting) (“The statute’s legislative history demonstrated that its purpose was not merely
to punish interracial marriage, but to do so for the sole benefit of the white race. . . .
Consequently, there was a fit between the class that the law was intended to discriminate
against (nonwhite races) and the classification enjoying heightened protection (race).”);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he statute there [in Loving],
prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other, was in substance anti-black
legislation.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) (“In Loving the Court determined
that the purpose of the antimiscegenation statute was racial discrimination . . . .”).
165
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 975; Hernandez, 855
N.E.2d at 11; Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989; see also Kerrigan, 957
A.2d at 503 n.26 (Borden, J., dissenting) (asserting that Loving is irrelevant in case challenging gender-specific marriage law because “the court in Loving correctly determined
that the antimiscegenation statute in question there was clearly aimed at the perpetuation
of white supremacy”).
166
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 601 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 n.11).
167
See id.
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preme Court168 sought to distinguish Loving and Perez—the California
Supreme Court case invalidating that state’s miscegenation statute—
“because the antimiscegenation statutes at issue in those cases plainly
treated members of minority races differently from White persons,
prohibiting only intermarriage that involved White persons.”169 Both
Loving and Perez mentioned the perceived need to “protect” the white
race from intermarriage.170 Similarly, the Maryland Supreme Court
emphasized “‘[t]he fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that [these were] . . .
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.’”171
Attempts to distinguish Loving’s heightened scrutiny holding because miscegenation laws—unlike gender-specific marriage laws—
were motivated by a racist desire to perpetuate white supremacy are
fatally flawed for three reasons: one legal, one factual, and another
practical. First, distinguishing Loving because miscegenation laws
were motivated by white supremacy confuses Step One and Step
Three of equal protection analysis. In Step One, the court asks
whether the challenged law classifies people based on a trait (such as
race or gender), which will determine the level of scrutiny in Step
Two. In Step Three, the court determines whether the challenged law
survives the appropriate level of scrutiny. When advocates for marriage equality request heightened scrutiny, they are asking courts to
recognize that for the purposes of Step One, gender-specific marriage
laws classify based on gender, a suspect classification. When the challenged statute contains the classification in its text, Step One is performed by simply reading the statute.172 When courts in same-sex
marriage cases focus on the improper motivation behind miscegenation laws in order to determine what level of scrutiny applies, judges
are confusing the level of scrutiny with the government’s interest in
creating the challenged classification, which is part of the Step Three
analysis.
In both the McLaughlin and Loving opinions, a unanimous Supreme Court treated Step One and Step Three as separate inquiries.
The McLaughlin Court followed the traditional process of equal protection analysis. With respect to Step One, the Justices noted that they
168
The California Supreme Court distinguished Loving and Perez to say that genderspecific marriage laws involve sexual orientation discrimination, not sex discrimination.
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437. The court held that the state’s prohibition on
same-sex marriage did not constitute sex discrimination but did violate the state equal
protection clause by unconstitutionally discriminating based on sexual orientation.
169
Id. The court quoted the language from Loving noting that Virginia’s miscegenation statute “prohibit[ed] only interracial marriages involving white persons.” Id.
170
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 23 (Cal. 1948).
171
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 601 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11).
172
See id. at 685 (recognizing the “threshold question of facial neutrality”).
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were “deal[ing] . . . with a classification based upon the race of the
participants.”173 After establishing that the Florida statute presented a
racial classification, the Supreme Court then proceeded to ask
“whether there clearly appears in the relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in by a white person and a Negro, but not
otherwise.”174 The Court ultimately concluded that the Florida law
failed Step Three.175
The Loving Court also followed the three-step process for analyzing equal protection claims. With respect to Step One, in the first
sentence of his opinion for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Warren
described Virginia’s statutory scheme as one based on “racial classifications.”176 In applying Step One, the Loving Court did not hold that
miscegenation laws constitute racial classification because they assume
and perpetuate white supremacy.177 Rather, the Court observed that
miscegenation laws constitute racial classification because they classify
people and regulate their conduct based on their race.178 Proceeding
to Step Two, although the State of Virginia argued that the Court
should apply rational basis review when conducting its equal protection analysis,179 the Court rejected the State’s plea180 because “[a]t the
173
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964); see also id. at 192 (“We deal
here with a racial classification embodied in a criminal statute.”).
174
Id. at 192. See Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument, supra note 154,
at 523 (“McLaughlin did not rely on any claims whatsoever about the motive for the law or
about the class that was harmed by the law. It simply noted that there was a racial classification and applied heightened scrutiny. The sex discrimination argument for protecting
gays from discrimination requires nothing more.”); see also Clark, supra note 13, at 120
(“[T]he McLaughlin repudiation of the single-standard counterargument should equally
repudiate the same counterargument as used to challenge the claim that discrimination
against same-sex couples or lesbians and gay men classifies on the basis of sex.”).
175
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196 (“Such a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid
state interest, bears a heavy burden of justification, as we have said, and will be upheld only
if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy.”); see also id. at 197–98 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“If, however, the interracial
cohabitation statute is considered to rest upon a discrete state interest, existing independently of the antimarriage law, it falls of its own weight.”); id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose under our Constitution for a state
law which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal
offense.”).
176
Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
177
Clark, supra note 13, at 150 (“Warren did not reason that racial classifications in
general or the classification in Loving in particular required strict scrutiny because they were
invidious or subordinating.”) (emphasis in original).
178
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe
generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races.”).
179
Id. at 8.
180
Id. (“[W]e do not accept the State’s contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose.”).

R

R

R
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very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’”181
Only after the Loving Court moved on to Step Three of equal
protection analysis did the Justices examine the purpose behind Virginia’s miscegenation statute. The Court began its Step Three inquiry
into the law’s purpose by noting that if racial classifications “are ever
to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment
to eliminate.”182 Only in its Step Three application did the Loving
Court mention white supremacy. In determining that the miscegenation statute did not survive strict scrutiny, Chief Justice Warren concluded, “[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.”183 The Court then condemned Virginia’s miscegenation
regime “as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”184
The fact that the Loving Court struck down Virginia’s miscegenation laws because they were based on white supremacy had nothing to
do with its determination in Step One that miscegenation laws represented a classification based on race and thus heightened scrutiny was
required. The Justices applied strict scrutiny because the law included
a racial classification (Step One), which required strict scrutiny (Step
Two), and then the Court struck down the law for lacking a legitimate
purpose (Step Three).185
181
Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); id. at 9
(“In the case at bar, however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the
fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of
justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes
drawn according to race.”); see also Clark, supra note 13, at 150–51 (“Warren concluded
that racial classifications, as such, required strict scrutiny in order to determine whether they
were invidious. Mere classification on the basis of race alone triggered strict scrutiny.
McLaughlin v. Florida was even clearer on this point.”) (emphasis in original).
182
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
183
Id.
184
Id. That the Court’s discussion of the link between miscegenation laws and white
supremacy is part of the Step Three analysis is also clear from the Loving Court’s review of
the earlier Virginia precedent. In 1955, in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the constitutionality of miscegenation laws.
The Supreme Court in Loving reasoned that what the Virginia state court characterized as
“legitimate purposes”—namely “‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration of racial
pride’”—were nothing more than “an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. The Loving Court essentially held that the miscegenation statute in
Naim could not survive Step Three analysis because the racial classification did not further
a legitimate state purpose but instead merely perpetuated the racist theory of white
supremacy. See id. at 7–8.
185
See Widiss, Rosenblatt & NeJaime, supra note 71, at 486–87 (noting that these are
separate steps).

R

R
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Yet even for the purposes of Step Three, the intent to perpetuate
white supremacy is not necessary for race-specific laws to violate Equal
Protection. Attempts to distinguish Loving by focusing on the intent
behind miscegenation laws must fail because the Loving “Court
reached its holding independently of the issue of discriminatory intent . . . , ‘find[ing] the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed
state purpose to protect the “integrity” of all races.’”186 Post-Loving
racial classifications are analyzed under strict scrutiny regardless of
whether the challenged law suggests that one race is superior or inferior to another.187 In short, Loving’s holding that rejects the use of
“equal application theory” during Step One of equal protection analysis is completely independent of the Court’s later discussion of white
supremacy. Thus, courts in same-sex marriage cases are precluded
from using equal application theory to deny heightened scrutiny of
gender-specific marriage laws.
Second, courts that distinguish Loving by contrasting the underlying purposes of miscegenation laws and gender restrictions in marriage incorrectly assume that gender-specific marriage statutes are
facially neutral. Most courts that uphold gender-specific marriage
laws look for an improper discriminatory purpose when performing
Step One.188 This approach is unsound because if a law facially contains a trait-based classification that is suspect—be it race, gender, or
another suspect classification—discriminatory intent does not matter
for Step One.189 The appropriate level of scrutiny is determined by
reference to the trait specified in the classification. In non-marriage
cases, courts consistently hold that the purpose of a racial classification does not determine the level of scrutiny.190 Discriminatory intent
is irrelevant when the challenged statute contains the racial classification in its text because all racial classifications receive strict scrutiny,
186

Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 685 (Md. 2007) (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11

n.11).
187
See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (racial segregation of prisoners faced strict scrutiny even though there was no implication that the segregation was
based on any notion that one race of prisoners was superior to another).
188
See, e.g., Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005 (D. Nev. 2012) (“The issue
turns upon the alleged discriminatory intent behind the challenged laws, which is the sine
qua non of a claim of unconstitutional discrimination.”).
189
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (“Racial classifications are suspect, and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice.”).
190
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Classifications based on race . . . are given
the most exacting scrutiny.” (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11)); Connerly v. State Pers. Bd.,
112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The strict scrutiny standard of review applies
regardless of whether a law is claimed to be benign or remedial, regardless of the race of
those burdened or benefited by a particular classification, and regardless of whether the
law may be said to benefit and burden the races equally.” (citations omitted)).
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not just classifications based on race with a purpose to injure one of
the enumerated races.191 The statute in Loving received strict scrutiny
because it contained a racial classification; that statute failed strict
scrutiny because the classification existed for improper purposes.192
The improper purpose of a law that has a facial racial classification
does not trigger strict scrutiny; the facial racial classification itself
does. Only if a law is facially neutral with respect to the challenged
classification does the court ask during Step One of equal protection
analysis whether the law nonetheless serves a discriminatory purpose
in order to determine whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate.
By insisting that they must look for an improper discriminatory
purpose when performing Step One analysis, courts consistently
describe prohibitions against same-sex marriage as “facially genderneutral statute[s].”193 This represents an extreme factual mischaracterization of the laws being challenged. A gender-specific marriage statute is by definition not gender-neutral. For a statute to be
truly gender-neutral, at a minimum, it must not make rights dependent on gender. Yet gender-specific marriage laws, by definition,
mention gender as they prohibit men from marrying men, as well as
women from marrying women. To call this statutory scheme “facially
gender-neutral” strains credulity.
In short, some courts have incorrectly looked for discriminatory
intent during the Step One analysis because they have improperly
treated gender-specific marriage laws as gender-neutral. But intent is
irrelevant during the Step One analysis because gender-specific marriage laws contain a gender-based classification on their face.194 This
automatically triggers heightened scrutiny.
191
City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 500; Clark, 488 U.S. at 461; Connerly, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 21; see also Mark Strasser, Interpretations of Loving in Lawrence, Baker, and Goodridge: On
Equal Protection and the Tiers of Scrutiny, 13 WIDENER L.J. 859, 870 (2004) (“Express classifications on the basis of race will trigger strict scrutiny even where there is no malicious purpose behind the classification.”).
192
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12 (“There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.”).
193
See, e.g., Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1098 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Section 572–1 does not treat males and females differently as a class. It is gender-neutral on
its face; it prohibits men and women equally from marrying a member of the same-sex.”);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (describing its gender-specific marriage
regime as “a facially gender-neutral statute”); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2004) (describing DOMA as facially gender neutral); see also Sevcik, 911 F .Supp. 2d
at 1004 (“[O]ne Defendant argues that the State has drawn no distinction at all because
the laws at issue are facially neutral with respect to both gender and sexual orientation.”).
194
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 686 (Md. 2007) (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (“Manifestly, [Maryland’s gender-specific marriage law] classifies on the basis of sex; because it
would be necessary to consider the underlying legislative intent only if the same-sex marriage ban did not draw sex-based distinctions, the question of legislative intent is irrelevant.
Just as in Loving, it is the nature of the classifications themselves that implicates strict scrutiny.”).
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Third, attempts to construe the Loving Court’s use of heightened
scrutiny as a function solely of the evils of white supremacy would fundamentally undermine the thrust and import of the decision. Some
modern judges fail to acknowledge that states often asserted interests
in miscegenation laws separate from white supremacy. Southern
states, such as North Carolina, claimed to be protecting the racial integrity of all races, not just the white race. In its amicus brief in the
Loving case, the State of North Carolina argued: “If a state feels like
the life of its people is better protected by a policy of racial integrity as
to both races, or for any other race for that matter, then it has the right
to legislate in such field.”195 Several state supreme courts upheld the
constitutionality of their miscegenation laws by asserting that the laws
did not target black people but instead protected them. For example,
the Alabama Supreme Court asserted that “it is for the peace and happiness of the black race, as well as of the white, that such [miscegenation] laws should exist.”196 In upholding its miscegenation law in
1878, the Virginia Supreme Court talked about protecting “both
races” and not simply the white race.197 Assuming for the sake of argument that these states were telling the truth198—that they imposed
a system of miscegenation laws in order to protect racial integrity of all
races—this would not affect the fact that under Step One of equal
protection analysis, these miscegenation regimes would be subject to
strict scrutiny.199
In distinguishing Loving’s heightened scrutiny holding, many
courts in same-sex marriage cases emphasize that Virginia’s miscegenation statute applied only to marriages of a white person to a
195
Brief of the State of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae at 6, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 113925, at *6 (emphasis added).
196
Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877); see also Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 298
(1871) (“It is said, this is discrimination against the negro. Really, those laws were intended to repress the white race, and not the negro . . . . It was not then aimed especially
against the blacks.”).
197
Kinney v. Virginia, 71 Va. 858, 869 (1878) (“The public policy of this state, in
preventing the intercommingling of the races by refusing to legitimate marriages between
them has been illustrated by its legislature for more than a century. . . . The purity of
public morals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the highest advancement of our cherished southern civilization . . . all require that they should be kept distinct
and separate, and that connections and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem
to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law, and be subject to no evasion.” (emphasis added)). Advocates of this position could find supporting evidence in the fact that
many black Americans opposed interracial marriage. See PASCOE, supra note 131, at 183
(evaluating the NAACP’s worries “that Blacks might actually support miscegenation laws”
and considering that “[y]et this was the prospect that arose in the mid-1920s, when a growing number of African Americans responded to the surging political power of calls for
white racial purity by advancing an offsetting program of black racial purity”).
198
I do not believe this to be the case.
199
Under Step Three of equal protection analysis, North Carolina’s miscegenation
statute, thus defended, would still necessarily fail to survive strict scrutiny.

R
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nonwhite person.200 Yet not all miscegenation laws were limited to
invalidating only those interracial marriages involving a white participant. For example, the State of North Carolina submitted an amicus
brief in Loving in order to defend its miscegenation statute that declared void:
All marriages between a white person and a Negro or between a
white person and a person of Negro descent to the third generation, inclusive, or between a Cherokee Indian of Robeson County
and a Negro, or between a Cherokee Indian of Robeson County
and a person of Negro descent to the third generation,
inclusive. . . .201

The argument that Loving only found an illegal racial classification
because the Virginia law furthered the theory of white supremacy
would suggest that the North Carolina law voiding marriages “between
a Cherokee Indian . . . and a Negro” would not be subject to heightened scrutiny. Yet despite the fact that some provisions of miscegenation statutes were not motivated by white supremacy, the Loving
decision invalidated these miscegenation statutes under strict scrutiny
as well. Any other reading of Loving would be absurd. Indeed, if the
motivation of perpetuating white supremacy is the requirement under
Loving, presumably a modern miscegenation law that barred marriages only between different nonwhite races would not get strict scrutiny. It is hard to believe that any judge would think that this is a
proper reading of Loving. Yet judges use this misconception of Loving
when evaluating challenges to gender-specific marriage laws in order
to prevent application of heightened scrutiny.
B. Group Rights Versus Individual Rights
Second, many courts that distinguish Loving’s rejection of the
equal application theory do so by treating the right to marry as a
group right. They assert that Loving invalidated miscegenation laws
because these statutes infringe the constitutional rights of black Americans as a group. Judges then attempt to contrast gender-specific marriage laws as not discriminating against men or women as a group.
For example, courts have held Loving inapplicable because whereas
the miscegenation statute constituted “anti-black legislation,” genderspecific marriage laws are not “designed to subordinate either men to
200

R

201

R

See supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text.
Brief of the State of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae, supra note 195, at 2 (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1965)). North Carolina’s criminal component of its miscegenation
laws, however, appears limited to “marriages between a white person and a negro, or between a white person and a person of negro descent to the third generation inclusive.”
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1951) (volume 1B).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-5\CRN502.txt

2014]

unknown

EMBRACING LOVING

Seq: 37

23-JUL-14

11:40

1113

women or women to men as a class.”202 Courts assert that this distinguishes Loving.203 These opinions then make the analytical leap that
unless a marriage ban’s “purpose is to discriminate against men or
women as a class . . . [it] does not classify according to gender.”204
Moreover, those courts that adopt the “equal application theory” to
hold that same-sex marriage bans do not classify or discriminate based
on sex frequently frame the issue as exclusively about group rights,
not individual rights.205
This group-based analysis to determine whether a particular classification has taken place for Step One purposes is inappropriate because as a matter of law, the rights at issue are individual rights, not
group rights.206 In miscegenation cases, courts treated the right to
marry as an individual right. In holding that Virginia’s miscegenation
statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Loving Court noted
that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
202
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005 (D. Nev. 2012) (asserting an absence of
gender classification because laws prohibiting same-sex marriage “are not directed toward
persons of any particular gender, nor do they affect people of any particular gender disproportionately such that a gender-based animus can reasonably be perceived”); Jackson v.
Abercrombie, 884 F .Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim is also subject to rational basis review. Hawaii’s marriage laws do not treat males and
females differently as a class; consequently, the laws do not discriminate on the basis of
gender.”); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (“DOMA, however,
does not single out men or women as a discrete class for unequal treatment . . . . Women,
as members of one class, are not being treated differently from men, as members of a
different class. . . . There is no evidence, from the voluminous legislative history or otherwise, that DOMA’s purpose is to discriminate against men or women as a class.” (emphasis
added)); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 509 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J.,
dissenting) (same); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) (same).
203
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–11 (“Women and men are treated alike—they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their own sex. This is not the
kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving.”). Why race-specific
marriage laws represent “sham equality” while gender-specific marriage laws do not is left
unexplained.
204
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 143 (emphasis added); see also Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989
(quoting Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11.).
205
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 599 (Md. 2007) (“Appellees counter the ‘equal
application theory’ by stating that the proper inquiry in this case is not whether Family Law
§ 2–201 singles out one sex or the other as a discrete class for disparate treatment. Rather,
because constitutional rights are individual rights, the same-sex couples posit that this
Court should examine how the legislative enactment affects individually each person seeking to marry.”). Dissenting in the Washington Supreme Court case, Justice Bridge noted
“the equal application theory at its core, depends upon the assumption that the ERA was
intended to prohibit only broad-based discrimination on the basis of sex without regard for
individual impacts.” Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1039 (Bridge, J., dissenting).
206
Even at the group level, the argument is flawed. In the context of miscegenation
laws, there was something that whites as a group could do that nonwhites could not: marry
other whites. Similarly in the context of gender-specific marriage laws, there is something
that men can do that women cannot: marry women.
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men.”207 It further concluded that “[u]nder our Constitution, the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”208 The Court
could not have been clearer that the rights at stake were individual
rights, not the rights of a class. Similarly, the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Perez v. Lippold,209 the first opinion to strike down a
miscegenation law as unconstitutional, held that “[t]he right to marry
is the right of individuals, not of racial groups. The equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution does not refer to rights of the
Negro race, the Caucasian race, or any other race, but to the rights
of individuals.”210 Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court opinions in
non-miscegenation cases have emphasized that “the right to marry is
of fundamental importance for all individuals.”211
This judicial focus in the miscegenation cases on individual
rights, not group rights, is consistent with equal protection law more
broadly. In Shelley v. Kraemer,212 the Court held that the “rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its
terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights.”213 In the context of racial classifications, the Supreme
Court has long held that “[b]ecause the Fourteenth Amendment ‘protect[s] persons, not groups,’ all ‘governmental action based on race—
a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the
laws has not been infringed.’”214 Similarly, in non-race equal protec207

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
209
198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
210
Id. at 20 (“In the absence of an emergency the state clearly cannot base a law impairing fundamental rights of individuals on general assumptions as to traits of racial
groups.”); see also id. at 19 (“Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with
the person of one’s choice, a statute that prohibits an individual from marrying a member
of a race other than his own restricts the scope of his choice and thereby restricts his right
to marry.”).
211
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
212
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
213
Id. at 22; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22) (stating that “[i]t is settled beyond question” that the rights
created by the Fourteenth Amendment are personal rights guaranteed to the individual).
214
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S.
701, 742–43 (2007) (stating that “the Equal Protection Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not
groups’” (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227)); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636
(1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group.”); Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 22 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (“In applying the strict scrutiny test, it must be remembered that the rights
created by the Equal Protection Clause are not group rights; they are personal rights which
are guaranteed to the individual.” (citations omitted)).
208
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tion cases, the Court has recognized that equal protection claims vindicate individual rights. For example, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,215 which
challenged a state law that allowed married people but not unmarried
people to access and use contraceptives, the Court did not hold that
the rights of unmarried persons as a group had been infringed;
rather, the individuals suffered because “the law impaired the exercise
of their personal rights.”216 Finally, and particularly relevant for our
purposes, the right to be free from government-sanctioned sex discrimination is also an individual right.217 Thus, whether it is the right
to marry or the right to be free from racial or gender discrimination,
equal protection rights belong to individuals.
Although Step One of equal protection analysis focuses on a trait
shared by a group of people, the fact that an individual plaintiff belongs to a group specified in Step One does not transform the analysis
into one based on group rights.218 It is true that gender-specific marriage laws prevent an individual woman from marrying her female
partner because she is a member of a group (women) who are all
forbidden from marrying another woman. But the fact that the discrimination is visited upon an entire group of people does not negate
the fact that the individual has suffered a deprivation of rights as an
individual. The denial of her individual rights is not mitigated by the
fact that people in another corresponding group (i.e., men) are similarly denied their individual right to marry a same-sex partner.
Like the legal battle over miscegenation laws, the current struggle
for marriage equality is a battle for individual rights. The discriminatory effect of gender-specific marriage laws is suffered by the individ215

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (emphasis added) (discussing
Eisenstadt).
217
See Giffin v. Crane, 716 A.2d 1029, 1037 (Md. 1998) (“[T]he equality between the
sexes demanded by the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment focuses on ‘rights’ of individuals ‘under the law.’”) (emphasis added). Similarly, state ERAs
require that the rights of any person cannot depend on sex-based classifications, unless the State demonstrates a compelling governmental interest,
and then only if the classification is narrowly tailored and precisely limited
to achieving that compelling interest. . . . [T]he analysis must focus on the
individual whose rights are infringed by the sex-based classification, because
rights accrue to the individual, not to couples, or to some abstract group
entity. We [have] emphasized that equal rights between the sexes are personal, not group, rights.
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 682 (Md. 2007) (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
218
The group membership serves a role in establishing heightened scrutiny in that
gender is a suspect classification, in part, because women as a group were historically discriminated against. The individual female plaintiff does not have to prove that she as an
individual was ever discriminated against in order to secure heightened scrutiny for her
claim. Thus, while her membership in a group informs what level of scrutiny the court will
apply, she is vindicating her individual rights and the fact that members of another group
may be similarly denied their rights does not affect her equal protection claim.
216
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ual whose government denies her the ability to marry her partner.219
That effect is not lessened by a court’s conclusion that despite the
discrimination against her personally, women as a class are not being
subordinated to men as a class by the gender-based classification of
the state’s marriage law. Yet when courts attempt to distinguish
Loving by requiring discrimination against a class, they fail to appreciate that the rights at issue are individual rights, not group rights. Most
importantly, the group-rights diversion is irrelevant to the simple fact
that because gender-specific marriage laws make the right to marry
dependent on gender, heightened scrutiny is required.
C. The Gendered Model of Marriage
The third argument that courts have employed to distinguish Loving is that a facial classification is not a classification for Step One
purposes unless the challenged law seeks to make the members of one
classified group inferior to the members of another classified group.
Several courts have asserted that same-sex marriage bans neither assume nor espouse the theory that one gender is inferior to another
and, thus, Loving is distinguishable.220 Many courts condemn the failure of marriage equality advocates “to show that gay and lesbian persons are excluded from marriage on account of or in order to
perpetuate gender stereotyping.”221 For example, the Vermont Supreme Court noted a lack of evidence to “demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws excluded same-sex couples because of
incorrect and discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about gender-role confusion.”222 Asserting a lack of evidence to
219
See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 686 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is sex discrimination at the level of the individual who wishes to marry but is precluded from doing so
because of the statute.”).
220
See, e.g., Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1098 (D. Haw. 2012)
(“There is nothing in the legislative history or elsewhere that suggests that the purpose of
[HRS] § 572–1 is to discriminate against men or women as a class.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 509 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting) (“The present
case is distinguishable from Loving and McLaughlin. There has been no showing that the
state’s civil union statute was passed with the purpose of discriminating based on gender.”); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 989–90 (Wash. 2006) (“[T]here is nothing in
DOMA that speaks to gender stereotyping within marriage.”); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at
503 n.26 (Borden, J., dissenting) (“It cannot reasonably be contended that our marriage
statutes, which have existed for centuries along with those of every other state, were aimed
at perpetuating heterosexual, rather than homosexual, supremacy.”).
221
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989; Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (noting
plaintiffs’ failure “to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws excluded same-sex
couples because of incorrect and discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety
about gender-role confusion” and noting “that evidence is not before us”).
222
Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13; see also Conaway, 932 A.2d at 602 (“Because there is no
evidence in the record before us that the Legislature intended with Family Law § 2–201 to
differentiate between men and women as classes on the basis of some misconception regarding gender roles in our society, we conclude that the ERA does not mandate that the
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prove that gender-specific marriage laws are intended to discriminate
against women, courts distinguish Loving and hold that Loving’s rejection of the equal application theory is inapplicable in same-sex marriage cases.223 These courts then rely on the equal application theory
to hold that gender-specific marriage laws do not discriminate based
on gender and, therefore, should not be reviewed with heightened
scrutiny.224
There are fundamental flaws with this effort to distinguish Loving
for Step One purposes. First, the argument that gender-specific marriage laws do not disadvantage one gender is irrelevant to Step One in
equal protection analysis. Step One asks only whether a law classifies
based on a specified trait—regardless of whether the classification disadvantages one group in particular.225 If so, heightened scrutiny is
applied. Because gender-specific marriage laws classify people and
limit their exercise of rights based on gender, there is no need to ever
consider the purposes of the classification in Step One. Heightened
scrutiny should attach automatically.
Second, even allowing for the fallacy that intent matters during
Step One when analyzing a trait-specific law, gender-specific marriage
laws are premised on a vision of marriage that assumes women are
inferior to men. Eminent scholars have already made the argument
that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples reinforces genderbased stereotypes that create a hierarchy with men above women.226
State recognize same-sex marriage based on the analogy to Loving.”). Some may suggest
that opposite-sex marriage predates the explicit desire to exclude same-sex couples from
the institution, implying that there is a tenuous link between prohibiting marriage equality
and pursuing the goal of female submission. While the male-female model of marriage has
existed for centuries, the state constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage are all of
recent vintage. These prohibitions have been championed by socially conservative legislators and special interest groups. It is these groups that seek to perpetuate a model of
marriage in which wives submit to husbands.
223
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (upholding the constitutionality of DOMA and stating, “[t]here is no evidence, from the voluminous legislative
history or otherwise, that DOMA’s purpose is to discriminate against men or women as a
class” and “[a]ccordingly, the marriage definition contained in DOMA does not classify
according to gender”).
224
See, e.g., id. (arguing that because DOMA does not “single out men or women as a
discrete class for unequal treatment” DOMA does not entitle a claimant to heightened
security under the equal application theory).
225
See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
226
See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 17 (1991) (“Whatever the impact that legalization of lesbian and gay marriage would have on the lives of lesbians and gay men, it has
fascinating potential for denaturalizing the gender structure of marriage law for heterosexual couples.”); Koppelman, supra note 72, at 159–60 (“Homosexuality threatens the hierarchy of the sexes because its existence suggests that even in that realm where a person’s sex
has been regarded as absolutely determinative, anatomy has less to do with destiny than
one might have supposed.”); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 218–21, 230–33 (discussing how many condemn homosexuality in
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This section of the Article contributes to the current scholarship by
showing how the opponents of marriage equality themselves envision
and support a model of marriage in which wives are inferior to
husbands.
The following discussion proceeds in two stages. First, the one
man–one woman model of marriage has historically assumed and perpetuated the subordination of women to men. Second, the primary
opponents of same-sex marriage wish to propagate and institutionalize their model of marriage in which a husband, by divine right, exercises authority over his wife. Same-sex marriages undermine their
efforts to encourage so-called “traditional marriage” by demonstrating
that marriages can be stable, loving, and successful without even the
possibility of a woman submitting to a man. Taken together, these
points show that the current opposition to the legality of same-sex
marriages is part of a futile attempt to turn back the clock and to
reconstruct a model of marriage that facilitates women being submissive to men.
In order to understand the current opposition to marriage equality, it is useful to appreciate the gendered history of marriage in
America. For most of our nation’s history, marriage was an institution
designed to put women in a lesser position to men.227 And for centuries, marriage law succeeded in doing just that. States maintained coverture laws pursuant to which “[t]he legal existence of a woman was
suspended by marriage”228 as the wife’s “legal and economic identity
was subsumed by her husband’s upon marriage.”229 As Professor
order to preserve “gender distinctions and traditional family relations premised upon
them”); Claudia A. Lewis, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual
Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1785–86 (1988) (“The definitional equation of marriage with
heterosexuality forms a self-enclosed system inaccessible to single-gender couples who desire equal protection under the law for their intimate enduring relationships. The summary state denial of homosexual marriage exposes the fundamental right to marry,
deemed to inhere in the individual, as an exclusive privilege conditioned upon heterosexual orientation.” (footnotes omitted)); Widiss, Rosenblatt & NeJaime, supra note 71, at 484
(“A court faced with a challenge to a restrictive marriage statute could find the statute to
be ‘a facially sex-based means of institutionalizing compulsory heterosexuality, an institution of male supremacy, in ways that hurt both sexes on the bases of their sex.’” (footnote
omitted)).
227
COTT, supra note 127, at 3 (“Political and legal authorities endorsed and aimed to
perpetuate nationally a particular marriage model: . . . [including] for the husband to be
the family head and economic provider, his wife the dependent partner.”) (emphasis in
original).
228
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 908 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17 (1982) (“The law created an equation in which
one plus one equaled one by erasing the female one.”).
229
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 958 (N.D. Cal. 2010); id. at 992
(“The marital bargain in California (along with other states) traditionally required that a
woman’s legal and economic identity be subsumed by her husband’s upon marriage under
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Sylvia Law has explained, “married women were civilly dead and subject to the control of their husbands.”230 The wife had no individual
right to enter a contract nor could she sue without her husband’s consent.231 Upon marriage, the wife’s prior personal property that she
brought into the marriage, including her money and jewelry, became
her husband’s absolute property.232 Coverture also prescribed that
“[a] wife’s obligation to take on the beliefs and the religious identity
of her husband was an ordinary aspect of coverture, indistinguishable
from her obligation to live where he wished or her obligation to take
his settlement as her own.”233
Coverture assumed and reinforced “what was then considered a
natural division of labor between men and women.”234 The coverture
regime also granted every husband “the right to correct his wife.
Since he was legally responsible for her misbehavior, he ought to be
able to use moderate ‘domestic chastisement,’ limited to what was
necessary for the due government of his family, in the same way that
he might correct his children or his apprentices.”235 At base, coverture required a wife’s subservience to her husband.236
Coverture was seen as a cornerstone to American marriage law.
Early efforts to transition away from coverture through so-called Marthe doctrine of coverture . . . .”). See generally COTT, supra note 127, at 52–53 (discussing
coverture); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 115–22 (2000) (same).
230
Law, supra note 226, at 199.
231
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 908. Furthermore, “if a woman did not hold property for her
‘sole and separate use’ prior to marriage, the husband received a freehold interest in all
her property, entitling him to all the rents and profits from the property.” Id.; see also
COTT, supra note 127, at 11–12 (stating that “[c]overture in its strictest sense meant that a
wife could not use legal avenues such as suits or contracts, own assets, or execute legal
documents without her husband’s collaboration” and that “the husband became the political as well as the legal representative of his wife, disenfranchising her”).
232
BASCH, supra note 228, at 51 (“Such personal property as the household furniture,
money, and jewels that the wife brings to marriage belongs to the husband absolutely.”);
COTT, supra note 127, at 12 (“The legal meaning of coverture pervaded the economic
realm as well. Upon marriage a woman’s assets became her husband’s property and so did
her labor and future earnings. Because her legal personality was absorbed into his, her
economic freedom of action was correspondingly curtailed.”). Women could try to circumvent coverture by creating a trust, but this was often difficult. Id. at 72.
233
HARTOG, supra note 229, at 153.
234
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 959; HARTOG, supra note 229, at 165 (“The law of coverture
rationalized and justified a structure of power. It existed for husbands as a ruling class,
expressed a particular male vision of responsibility and duty and power.”).
235
HARTOG, supra note 229, at 116 (discussing Blackstone); id. at 166 (“The role of the
law of coverture in constructing a husbandly identity bears some resemblance to the role
slave law played in stilling the moral conscience of the American slaveholder. Just as slaveholders needed slave law, so husbands needed coverture.”).
236
BASCH, supra note 228, at 17 (“The doctrine of marital unity not only mandated the
wife’s subservience to her husband, but it also held the distinction of obliterating her legal
identity.”).
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ried Women’s Property Laws237 were greeted with doomsday prophecies by some state legislators who argued that allowing wives to own
property would lead to “infidelity in the marriage bed, a high rate of
divorce, and increased female criminality.”238 In defense of coverture,
one Maryland judge explained why denying wives any legal and economic identity was necessary to keep women submissive:
For let it once be understood that a wife, whenever she may become
tired of her husband, or moved by any whim or caprice, may leave
him, and take with her the whole property that she ever owned, and
enjoy it exclusively, and thus become independent of that superiority and controlling power which the law has always wisely recognized
in the husband, what incentive would there be for such a wife ever
to reconcile differences with her husband, to act in submission to
his wishes, and perform the many onerous duties pertaining to her
sphere? Would not every wife, with property enough to sustain herself independently of her husband, when becoming impatient of his
restraint and control, however necessarily exercised over her, take
the refuge such a law would give her, and abandon her husband
and her home?239

In other words, coverture was necessary lest a woman have the financial capacity to leave a controlling husband instead of submitting “to
his wishes.” Many judges resisted the changes in statutory law, for example, by continuing “to interpret wives’ housework as owned by their
husbands.”240
237
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 908–09 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing Vermont’s Rights of Married Women Act, which “grant[ed]
married women property and contractual rights independent of their husbands”). See generally BASCH, supra note 228, at 16–17 (discussing Married Women’s Property Laws).
238
EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS 64 (2004) (citation omitted). Nancy Cott
has explained that Married Women’s Property Laws were motivated in part to protect women’s assets from a husband’s creditors, as opposed to any desire to treat wives as
co-sovereigns in a marriage. COTT, supra note 127, at 52–53.
239
Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 294, 308 (1858); see also BASCH, supra note 228, at 140
(“William Alcott, one of the most popular manual writers of the day, defined matrimony
for women as an act of submission and concession, best symbolized by the wife’s assumption of her husband’s name. The more cheerful and voluntary the submission, he predicted, the better the marriage.” (citing WILLIAM ALCOTT, THE YOUNG WIFE, OR DUTIES OF
WOMAN IN THE MARRIAGE 29–30 (1837))).
240
COTT, supra note 127, at 54; id. at 168–69. Norma Basch has explained:
The judiciary limited the impress of the [Married Women’s Property Laws]
in three basic ways. First, by declaring sections unconstitutional and void,
they narrowed the applicability of the statutes. Second, by relying on equity
precedents that required the delineation of the married woman’s estate to
be clear and unambiguous, they limited the number of estates affected.
Third and most important, by professing their faith in the propriety and
the desirability of the old common law fiction of marital unity, and by applying that fiction to the countless situations the statutes did not spell out,
they eviscerated the spirit and intent of the legislation.
BASCH, supra note 228, at 202–03.
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Coverture was but one of the legal rules that made wives legally
inferior to husbands. In addition to coverture, the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity effectively prevented a wife from suing
her husband for any tort he might commit against her.241 Like coverture, the rule of interspousal immunity assumed and reinforced a
subordinate position for women in a marriage.242 The marital rape
exception—common until the 1970s—effectively gave a husband the
legal right to rape his wife.243 Furthermore, wives who failed to be
“obedient” faced legal consequences. For example, a woman seeking
to leave a bad marriage through divorce “had to show how attentive,
obedient, and long-suffering she had been (and of course sexually
faithful) while she was being victimized.”244
While the legal position of women and wives has improved, the
primary opponents to marriage equality continue to support a
gendered model of marriage reminiscent of the social theories that
animated coverture laws. Anti-gay organizations endorse a model of
marriage in which wives are submissive to their husbands.245 It is reasonable to examine the motivations of these groups because they are
the prime movers behind state actions to ban same-sex marriage
through constitutional amendments that require gender-specific marriage laws. These social conservative groups have played major roles
in drafting same-sex marriage prohibitions, lobbying against marriage
equality in state legislatures, and defending gender-specific marriage
laws in court.246 Some of these groups, such as The National Organization for Marriage, exist solely to deny marriage rights to same-sex
241
See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 593 n.22 (Md. 2007) (“The common law doctrine of inter-spousal immunity barred a wife from bringing a cause of action, without her
husband’s concurrence, in order to recover for losses sustained as a result of either person
or property injury.” (discussing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 507 (Md. 1983))); COTT,
supra note 127, at 162.
242
This doctrine existed well into the modern era. For example, the Maryland Supreme Court did not abrogate the doctrine of interspousal immunity until 1983. Boblitz,
462 A.2d at 521.
243
COTT, supra note 127, at 211; HARTOG, supra note 229, at 306–07 (“A man does not
commit rape by having sexual intercourse with his lawful wife, even if he does so by force
and against her will.”).
244
COTT, supra note 127, at 49.
245
See Wayne Grudem, Wives Like Sarah, and the Husbands Who Honor Them, in RECOVERING BIBLICAL MANHOOD & WOMANHOOD: A RESPONSE TO EVANGELICAL FEMINISM 196 (John
Piper & Wayne Grudem eds., 1991) (“Submission is an inner quality of gentleness that
affirms the leadership of the husband. ‘Be submissive to your husbands’ means that a wife
will willingly submit to her husband’s authority and leadership in the marriage . . . . Of
course, it is an attitude that goes much deeper than mere obedience, but the idea of willing obedience to a husband’s authority is certainly part of this submission . . . .”); ANDREAS
J. KOSTENBERGER, GOD, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY: REBUILDING THE BIBLICAL FOUNDATION 59
(2d ed. 2010) (“[T]here is a sense in which wives are called to submit to their husbands in
a way that is nonreciprocal.” (citation omitted)).
246
As government officials stop defending gender-specific marriage laws in court, social conservatives—as amici and intervenors—will play an even larger role in this litigation.
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couples.247 One of the most outspoken opponents of same-sex marriage, and gender equality in general, is Phyllis Schlafly, the founder
of the Eagle Forum. The Eagle Forum has provided a major leadership role in propagating prohibitions against same-sex marriage, serving as an amicus defending gender-specific marriage laws in several
state and federal cases.248 Schlafly has argued strenuously that the
husband should be in charge because “[i]f marriage is to be a successful institution, it must likewise have an ultimate decision maker, and
that is the husband.”249
Schlafly is but one of the leading spokespeople who opposes
same-sex marriage and supports the wife-submissive model of marriage. Wayne Grudem, Research Professor of Bible and Theology at
Phoenix Seminary and the former president of the Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, has worked with many prominent
anti-gay organizations in opposing same-sex marriage, including the
Family Research Council, Pennsylvania Family Institute, North Carolina Family Policy Council, and the National Organization for Marriage.250 He has argued that “wives should forsake resistance to their
247
See Our Work, NAT’L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE, https://nationformarriage.org/index.
php/main/ourwork (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
248
See, e.g., Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2012)
(Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund serving as amicus defending section 3 of
DOMA); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2012) (amicus defending California’s Proposition 8); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 58 (Cal. 2009) (amicus defending
California’s Marriage Protection Act); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 18 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (Eagle Forum of Indiana serving as amicus defending Indiana’s DOMA); Brief Amicus Curiae of Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund, Inc., In Support of Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives, United States v. Windsor,
No. 12-307 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2013), 2013 WL 355760 (amicus defending section 3 of DOMA
and supporting reversal of lower court’s decision); Brief Amicus Curiae of Eagle Forum
Educ. & Legal Def. Fund, Inc., In Support of Petitioners In Support of Reversal, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2013), 2013 WL 367055 (amicus defending California’s Proposition 8); Amicus Curiae Brief of Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund In
Support of Intervener-Appellant In Support of Reversal, Golinski v. Office Of Pers. Mgmt.,
Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409 (9th Cir. June 11, 2012), 2012 WL 2338874 (amicus defending
section 3 of DOMA); Brief for Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund In
Support of Appellants’ Petition For Reconsideration and Rehearing En Banc, Perry v.
Brown, Nos. 10-16696 & 11-16577 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2012), 2012 WL 956455 (amicus defending California’s Proposition 8).
249
PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 50 (1977). Schlafly championed the husband’s power to make decisions for the family, including his unilateral “right
to establish the location of the family home.” Id. at 92.
250
See Press Release, Family Research Council, Family Research Council to Host Webcast Lecture on Global Poverty by Dr. Wayne Grudem (Dec. 3, 2013), available at http://
www.frc.org/newsroom/family-research-council-to-host-webcast-lecture-on-global-povertyby-dr-wayne-grudem; Tom Shaheen, Dr. Wayne Grudem Coming to Pittsburgh, PA. FAM. INST.
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://pafamily.wordpress.com/2010/08/10/dr-wayne-grudem-comingto-pittsburgh/; John Piper, A Biblical Perspective, The Surpassing Goal: Marriage Lived for the
Glory of God, N.C. FAM. POL’Y COUNCIL, http://www.ncfpc.org/pdffiles/MarriageAmdt
StudyGuide.pdf (adapted from a book edited by Wayne Grudem); Politics and the Bible, Part
2, N.C. FAM. POL’Y COUNCIL (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.ncfamily.org/radioshowarchives
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husbands’ authority and grow in willing, joyful submission to their
husbands’ leadership.”251
Opponents of same-sex marriage believe that the wife-submissive
model of marriage is mandated by God and the Bible.252 For example, Beverly Lahaye, founder of Concerned Women for America, a
social conservative organization that actively lobbies against same-sex
marriage, argues that “[s]ubmission is God’s design for the wife just as
the husband is assigned to be the head of the wife.”253 Lynn Wardle is
the most prolific law professor who opposes marriage equality and,
more broadly, equal rights for gay Americans.254 In presenting his
view of love within marriage, Wardle endorses the Biblical propositions that “wives [should] submit to and respect husbands” and “wives
2012.html (discussion with Wayne Grudem on the radio show, “Family Policy Matters”).
Grudem was an influential signatory on the Manhattan Declaration, authored by Robert
George, NOM Board Member. See PhoenixSeminary1, Dr. Wayne Grudem on “Why Theology
is Important,” YOUTUBE (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/embed/WXiLiUjGaWU;
see also MANHATTAN DECLARATION, http://www.manhattandeclaration.org/#0 (last visited
Mar. 18, 2014).
251
WAYNE GRUDEM, COUNTERING THE CLAIMS OF EVANGELICAL FEMINISM 307 (2006) (citations omitted).
252
See id. at 21 (“God has established this distinct leadership role—male headship—
for the husband in marriage.”). Wayne Grudem holds out his own marriage and relationship with his wife as a template for all to follow:
But in every decision, whether large or small, and whether we have reached
agreement or not, the responsibility to make the decision still rests with
me . . . . [T]here is a quiet, subtle acknowledgment that the focus of the
decision-making process is the husband, not the wife. And even though
there will often be much discussion, and though there should be much
mutual respect and consideration of each other, yet ultimately the responsibility to make the decision rests with the husband. And so in our marriage,
the responsibility to make the decision rests with me. This is not because I
am wiser or a more gifted leader. It is because I am the husband, and God
has given me that responsibility.
WAYNE GRUDEM, BIBLICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR MANHOOD AND WOMANHOOD 38 (2002); id. at
24 (“‘A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her
husband . . . .’”).
Wayne Grudem argues against allowing women to be ordained, asserting that it would
cause “an erosion of male leadership in the family because the modeling of female leadership in the pastorate will be reflected in a lessening of male leadership in the home.”
Women Pastors: Not the “Path to Blessing,” BELIEFNET, Interview by Laura Sheahen with Wayne
Grudem, http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/Christianity/2006/10/Women-Pastors-NotThe-Path-To-Blessing.aspx?p=2.
253
BEVERLY LAHAYE, THE NEW SPIRIT-CONTROLLED WOMAN 130 (2005); KOSTENBERGER,
supra note 245, at 57 (“[S]ince Christ is shown to have supreme authority over all supernatural as well as earthly beings, the husband’s headship . . . by analogy is seen as connoting
the exercise of authority over his wife as well.”).
254
See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221 (2005) (arguing for the preservation of federalism in family law);
Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in Family
Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137 (2004) (arguing for the preservation of federalism in family
law by supporting the Federal Marriage Amendment); Lynn D. Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why and How, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 439 (2006) (same).
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must be submissive, pure and reverent.”255 Similarly, the North Carolina Family Policy Council, which successfully lobbied that state’s voters to amend their constitution to forbid same-sex couples from
marrying, advocates a Christian marriage in which “both spouses fulfill the roles God intended for them—the man as leader like Christ,
the wife as advocate and follower of that leadership.”256 In short, the
most vocal opponents of same-sex marriage believe that the husband
has authority over his wife.257
In addition to believing that wives should be submissive, opponents of same-sex marriage argue that the division of labor in a marriage should be based on gender. Opponents of gender-neutral
marriage laws oppose wives entering the workforce while husbands
tend house.258 Schlafly encourages women to stay out of the labor
force and to stay home and have more children.259 Indeed, according
to the traditionalist’s view of marriage, a wife has a responsibility to
“present[ ] her husband with children (especially male ones).”260
During the national debate over the Equal Rights Amendment, Schlafly argued that women already have enough rights, including “the
most basic and precious legal right that wives now enjoy: the right to
be a full-time homemaker.”261 More recently, in encouraging women
not to enter the work force, she has argued that “servitude to a husband” is more tolerable than “servitude to a boss.”262
255
Lynn D. Wardle, All You Need is Love?, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 51, 63
n.40 (2004).
256
Piper, supra note 250.
257
See GRUDEM, supra note 251, at 21 (“This idea of male headship in marriage is seen
first in the order that men and women were created. . . . Not only was Adam created
before his wife; he was also given the responsibility of naming her: . . . the responsibility to
name created things is always the person who has authority over those things.”).
258
See KOSTENBERGER, supra note 245, at 63 (“Problems may arise only if the pattern
were to be so completely reversed that a given husband is focusing primarily or exclusively
on the domestic sphere while the wife is part of the labor force.”).
259
See PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, FEMINIST FANTASIES 96 (2003) (“It is in the best long-term
interests of female workers as well as male workers for public policy to encourage the dependent wife to care for her own children rather than to induce her to enter the labor
force. . . . [T]hey have fewer children. . . . The social and economic costs of artificially
inducing more millions of wives into the labor market could be tremendous.” (quoting
Changes Needed to Insure the Economic Stability of the Social Security Trust Funds: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 549 (1981)
(statement of Phyllis Schlafly, President, Eagle Forum))); SCHLAFLY, supra, at 207 (“Society
simply has not invented a better way of raising children than the traditional family with a
father-breadwinner and a mother-homemaker.”).
260
KOSTENBERGER, supra note 245, at 30.
261
SCHLAFLY, supra note 249, at 79.
262
SCHLAFLY, supra note 259, at 197 (“If you complain about servitude to a husband,
servitude to a boss will be more intolerable. Everyone in the world has a boss of some kind.
It is easier for most women to achieve a harmonious working relationship with a husband
than with a foreman, supervisor, or office manager.”).
Schlafly presents women with a false choice—submission to a boss or submission to a
husband. It has apparently not occurred to Schlafly that a woman need not be submissive
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Many current proponents of gendered marriage are less shrill
than Schlafly and often invoke innocent phraseology, such as describing the virtues of wives “helping” their husbands, as well as husbands
and wives “complementing” each other. These words mean different
things to their authors and target audiences than they do to judges
and others uninitiated in this branch of theology. When social conservatives discuss the different roles that a husband and wife should
play in a marriage, they describe the wife as the “helper,”263 by which
they mean the woman “who by virtue of creation serves in a role of
lesser authority in the relationship.”264 The helper—who by definition is the wife—must be subordinate to the husband.265
Similarly, opponents of same-sex marriage argue that only
opposite-sex marriage should be legally recognized because only the
latter can satisfy the criterion of complementarity, which they argue
“is an essential and foundational . . . design of marriage.”266 Complementarity may sound innocuous, but to those religious conservatives
who invoke the concept to advocate against same-sex marriage, men
and women complement each other because the husband dictates
and the wife obeys.267 Namely, “complementarians believe that men
and women are ontologically equal, yet functionally distinct—with
men primarily characterized by servant leadership and women primarily characterized by gracious submission.”268 In short, opponents of
same-sex marriage do not view complements as equals; wives are
inferior.
at all. A woman can be her own boss. She can be in a marriage of equals, whether it be to
a man or another woman.
263
Andreas J. Kostenberger, The Bible’s Teaching on Marriage and Family, FAM. RES.
COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/brochure/the-bibles-teaching-on-marriage-and-family (last
visited Mar. 18, 2014) (“Mutuality, however, does not mean sameness in role. Scripture is
clear that wives are to submit to their husbands and to serve as their ‘suitable helpers,’
while husbands are to bear the ultimate responsibility for the marriage before God.” (citations omitted)).
264
GRUDEM, supra note 251, at 22.
265
See Raymond C. Ortlund, Jr., Male-Female Equality and Male Headship, in RECOVERING
BIBLICAL MANHOOD & WOMANHOOD: A RESPONSE TO EVANGELICAL FEMINISM, supra note 245,
at 104 (“Subordination is entailed in the very nature of a helping role.”).
266
KOSTENBERGER, supra note 245, at 38. Similarly, Professor Wardle argues that samesex couples should be prohibited from marrying because they lack the complementary
nature of “gender differences [that] is an indispensable purpose of the institution of marriage.” Lynn D. Wardle, The Boundaries Of Belonging: Allegiance, Purpose and the Definition of
Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 301 (2011).
267
See Evan Lenow, The Challenge of Homosexuality for Gender Roles, 17 J. FOR BIBLICAL
MANHOOD & WOMANHOOD 28, 32 (2012) (“As complementarians, we believe that husbands
have particular roles in marriage, and wives have particular roles in marriage. . . . Wives,
on their part, submit themselves to the leadership of their husbands just as the church
submits to Christ. She respects her husband and seeks his counsel on spiritual matters. As
complementarians, we believe these gender roles were instituted at creation and are reaffirmed after the fall.”).
268
Id. at 29.
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Supporters of gendered marriage project their view of the submissive wife on to women generally.269 Schlafly mocks those who perceive her philosophy as humiliating to women because, she reasons,
the woman is being taken care of by her man and thus “the prize is
worth the price.”270 According to the founder of Concerned Women
of America, a woman’s worth is a function of her submission to her
husband: “As the wife humbles herself and submits to the headship of
her husband, she will begin to find her real meaning in that relationship.”271 America has come a long way since the 1970s, but Schlafly’s
thinking—and that of the many she speaks for and to—have not.
They continue to argue that a woman can only have a “happy marriage” if she submits to her husband.272
Many opponents of marriage equality are sufficiently shrewd to
know that they should argue the “heterosexual paradigm reflected in
the dual-gender requirement is not based upon the notion that one
gender is superior and one inferior.”273 Their refutations on this
point, however, are transparent sleights of hand. Professor Wardle,
for example, argues that
there is no evidence that the proposed new same-sex marriage institution would not be dominated by males in short order. Since male
homosexuals outnumber female homosexuals by a ratio of at least
two to one, it is highly probable that same-sex marriage would be a
gay- (male-) dominated institution . . . . Thus, despite the superficial appeal of the gender-discrimination argument based on the
Loving analogy, upon careful examination there is no substance to
the argument.274

Professor Wardle misconstrues the gender-discrimination argument. The issue of dominance is not whether more male couples will
marry than female couples; rather, the dominance structure sup269
See SCHLAFLY, supra note 259, at 31 (“Except for the unfortunate women who were
caught up in the feminist foolishness of the 1970s, most women don’t want to be liberated
from home, husband, family, and children.”).
270
SCHLAFLY, supra note 249, at 55 (“She knows how to make him feel like a man—and
to remember always that she is a woman. Is this degrading to the wife? Humiliating? Subservient? Or any of the other extravagant liberationist adjectives? How ridiculous! It is
just the application of the Golden Rule with a simple male/female variation. Most women
think that the prize is worth the price.”).
271
LAHAYE, supra note 253, at 131.
272
Id. at 96 (“[O]nce she gets that message and understands that she cannot be an
effective spiritual wife unless she does submit to her husband, she will have a lasting and
happy marriage. Only then will she reap the blessings of a life filled with godly submission.”). Furthermore, husbands become frustrated when their wives do not submit. Id. at
214 (“The most frustrated men my husband and I deal with are not vocational or educational failures. They are men whose wives do not respect them through submission.”).
273
Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 243 (1998) (citing Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 87–88).
274
Wardle, supra note 273, at 87.
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ported by so-called traditionalists plays out in each individual marriage in which Wardle suggests a wife who wants to be loved should
submit to her husband. Finally, Wardle argues that there is no
proof that the opposite-gender marriage requirement causes
gender-stereotyping.275 That is irrelevant; miscegenation laws did not
cause the theory of white supremacy. They assumed it. Similarly,
gender-specific marriage laws are based on—or supported because
of—the assumption of female submission and inferiority.
Opponents of same-sex marriage oppose equality for gay Americans because marriages between same-sex couples upset the gendered
model of marriage.276 Social conservatives oppose same-sex marriage
because they believe that each gender must serve a unique genderbased role in a marriage.277 If a marriage is composed of two women,
one of them will have to perform the “male role.” Conversely, in a
marriage composed of two men, one of them will have to perform the
“female role.” It is this transgression of gender roles that opponents
of marriage equality find so distressing. Marriages between same-sex
couples offend opponents’ vision of marriage because this means that
a man is not exercising authority over a woman.278
When courts assert that gender-specific marriage laws are not intended to put one gender in an inferior position to the other gender,
they are ignoring both the history of marriage in America and the
desire of major players in the anti-gay marriage movement to keep
women submissive to men. Supporters of gender-specific marriage
laws attempt to spin their vision of marriage as not treating women as
inferior but rather exalting women and protecting them. For example, Phyllis Schlafly has argued that women need marriage in order to

275

See id. at 88.
Of course, not all opponents of same-sex marriage endorse a male-dominant view
of marriage, just as not everyone who supported miscegenation laws was a white supremacist. (After all, many nonwhites supported miscegenation laws.) Nevertheless, many of the
prime leaders of the marriage-discrimination movement espouse a vision of legal marriage
in which wives are inferior to husbands, just as many proponents of miscegenation laws
intended to promulgate their (false) viewpoint that nonwhites were inferior to whites.
277
See William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 172
(2004) (“Redefining marriage to include same-sex couples is a legal endorsement of the
fungibility of men and women, mothers and fathers.”); Widiss, Rosenblatt & NeJaime,
supra note 71, at 463 (“Conservatives who argue against marriage for same-sex couples
explicitly and implicitly invoke sex stereotypes about women’s and men’s roles.”); id. at 499
(“[C]onservative advocates often make explicit connections between opposition to marriage by individuals of the same sex and preservation of ‘traditional’ gender-differentiated
family roles.”).
278
Opponents of marriage equality assert that there needs to be one ultimate
decision-maker and it needs to be the man. If there is no man, a marriage lacks an ultimate decision-maker. If a marriage is composed of two men, it has one decision-maker too
many.
276
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secure the protection of a man.279 She argues that men should be
paid more than women so that husbands can provide for their
wives.280
Similarly, Professor Wardle argues that same-sex marriage should
be illegal because one of the foundational purposes of marriage is
“protecting those who undertake the most vulnerable family roles for
the benefit of society, especially wives and mothers.”281 Many amicus
briefs by conservative groups opposing marriage equality argued that
opposite-sex marriage is necessary to protect mothers and vulnerable
women.282 The Family Research Council, perhaps the most vociferous
national anti-gay lobbying force, champions opposite-sex marriage as
a means for wives to encourage and facilitate their husbands’
employability.283 Opponents of marriage equality argue that oppositesex marriage forces men into this provider role. For example, Maggie
Gallagher, former chair of the National Organization for Marriage, an
anti-gay organization that exists solely to prevent same-sex couples
from receiving any legal protections, has argued that opposite-sex
marriage is necessary because it creates social expectations, such that:
When a wife urges a husband to look for a job, for example, she
does not have to make an extended argument based on personal
taste and preferences. Her bargaining position is immensely
strengthened because she can fall back on the attitudes and expectations of the wider culture to support her position: Husbands are
supposed to have jobs.284
279
SCHLAFLY, supra note 249, at 96 (“[T]here are male and female roles. It is just as
hurtful to a man to be deprived of his role as provider and protector as it is to a woman to
be deprived of her maternal role. It is just as hurtful to a husband to be deprived of his
right to have a wife who is a mother for his children as it is to a wife to be deprived of her
right to be a full-time homemaker.”); SCHLAFLY, FEMINIST FANTASIES, supra note 259, at 89
(“[A] man must carry his share by physical protection and financial support of his children
and of the woman who bears his children . . . .”).
280
SCHLAFLY, supra note 259, at 99 (“We want a society in which the average man
earns more than the average woman so that his earnings can fulfill his provider role in
providing a home and support for his wife who is nurturing and mothering their children.”) Examination On Issues Affecting Women In Our Nation’s Labor Force: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 97th Cong. 398 (1981) (statement of Phyllis Schlafly, President, Eagle Forum)).
281
Wardle, supra note 266, at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted).
282
Widiss, Rosenblatt & NeJaime, supra note 71, at 496–97 (citing to various
examples).
283
Sharon Barrett, The End of Men, the End of Families, FAM. RES. COUNCIL BLOG (Oct.
10, 2012), http://frcblog.com/2012/10/the-end-of-men-the-end-of-families/ (“Marriage,
because it demands commitment, makes men more employable. . . . Men are less employable today not because women have squeezed them out of the job market, but because
women are not marrying them.”).
284
LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 22–23 (2000); see also Wardle,
supra note 266, at 300 (“Likewise those who make the greatest sacrifice of personal incomemaximization in order to provide nurturing roles within the family (especially wives and
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In their view, a marriage in which a man and a woman perform their
gender-defined roles protects women. This is the same rationale that
nineteenth-century courts used to justify coverture laws.285
Laws that are intended to protect women by treating men and
women differently are, by definition, not gender neutral and, therefore, subject to heightened scrutiny.286 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has recognized that laws defended as protecting women place women
in a position of inferiority to men. For example, the Court has repudiated its earlier decisions upholding laws designed to protect women
by limiting their lives to running a household. In 1873, the Supreme
Court upheld Illinois’ prohibition against allowing women to practice
law.287 Justice Joseph P. Bradley reasoned:
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions
of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is
repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. . . . The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.288

mothers) are best protected by gender-integrated marriage to an opposite-sex partner
upon whom expectations of being the family provider are socially reinforced.”).
285
See BASCH, supra note 228, at 55–56 (“Furthermore, specific statements by Blackstone consistently sparked editorial outrage. At the end of his discussion of married women’s legal disabilities, for example, Blackstone asserted with equanimity that ‘even the
disabilities which the wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and
benefit. So great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England.’” (quoting 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 392 (1765))); see, e.g., Miller v.
Miller, 1 N.J. Eq. 386, 391 (N.J. Ch. 1831) (“The wife, by marriage, has parted with her
property, placed herself under the control of her husband, and looks to him for
support.”).
286
See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (“[I]f the statutory objective is to exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender because they are presumed
to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.”) (citation omitted); Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 861 n.12 (9th Cir.
2001) (“Good intentions—including the desire to protect women from harmful work conditions—do not render such gender classifications constitutional.”); Sail’er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541 (Cal. 1971) (“Laws which disable women from full participation in
the political, business and economic arenas are often characterized as ‘protective’ and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or ethnic minorities would readily be recognized
as invidious and impermissible. The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all
too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.”).
287
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872).
288
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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A century later, the Supreme Court recognized that such laws seeking
to honor women by protecting them from life beyond the domestic
sphere are part of “our Nation[’s] . . . long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect,
put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”289 Yet opponents of
same-sex marriage demand that state and federal law impose a model
of marriage to facilitate this precise dynamic. Most importantly for
our purposes, any arguments suggesting that opposite-sex marriage
laws are necessary to protect women go to Step Three of equal protection analysis (i.e., whether a classification is sufficiently justified) and
not to Step One (i.e., whether a classification exists). These arguments are, therefore, irrelevant to the issue of whether gender-specific
marriage laws should receive heightened scrutiny.
Ultimately, whether gender-specific marriage laws are motivated
by a desire to keep women in an inferior position is irrelevant to the
issue of determining the appropriate level of scrutiny. Under basic
principles of equal protection jurisprudence, the fact that these laws
make the legality of conduct a function of gender is sufficient to require heightened scrutiny. The above discussion shows that even
adopting the (incorrect) conceit that motive matters for Step One
purposes, a strong argument can be made that support for preventing
same-sex marriage is driven by a desire to maintain a gendered model
of marriage that places women in a position of inferiority. Because
the refusal to allow men to marry men and allow women to marry
women is based on a worldview that puts women in an inferior position to men, courts are wrong to distinguish Loving on the grounds
that gender-specific marriage regimes are not premised on one gender being superior to the other.
In short, courts are wrong to assert that Loving’s rejection of
equal application theory does not apply to same-sex marriage
litigation. Courts that distinguish Loving on the ground that
gender-specific marriage laws do not assume one gender is inferior to
another are making two mistakes, one legal and one factual. Legally,
the motivation behind a trait-specific law is irrelevant for determining
whether that trait is suspect and, thus, whether heightened scrutiny is
required. Factually, the major political actors against same-sex marriage are motivated by the desire to implement a model of marriage
that makes women inferior to men. Thus, whether or not courts correctly apply the legal framework for equal protection claims, heightened scrutiny applies to gender-specific marriage laws.

289

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Prohibitions on same-sex marriage represent a form of sex discrimination. Laws that make the right to marry a function of gender
necessarily classify and discriminate based on sex. States have evaded
this basic precept of equal protection jurisprudence by arguing that
gender-specific marriage laws treat both sexes equally because they
forbid both men and women from marrying a partner of the same sex.
This is the precise equal application theory that the Supreme Court
rejected in Loving v. Virginia.290 Loving stands for the simple proposition that if a law is trait-specific and that classification is suspect, then
the law is subject to heightened scrutiny when challenged on equal
protection grounds.291
Instead of following the clear dictate of Loving, state courts have
consistently distinguished the Supreme Court’s opinion by focusing
on the discriminatory motive behind Virginia’s miscegenation law. In
doing so, courts commit three separate mistakes. First, courts are misapplying basic equal protection principles because motive is irrelevant
during Step One if the challenged law includes a suspect classification
in its text, as gender-specific marriage laws do by definition.292 Second, courts treat the right to marry as if it were a group right when
marriage cases involving opposite-sex couples clearly establish that the
rights at stake are individual rights.293 Third, courts assert that
gender-specific marriage laws do not stereotype one gender as inferior
to another—as miscegenation laws did with respect to race—despite
the fact that opponents of same-sex marriage seek to perpetuate a
submissive-wife philosophy of marriage.294
Loving is not distinguishable with respect to its holding regarding
Step One of equal protection analysis. Just as Loving held that
race-specific marriage laws classify based on race (and are thus subject
to heightened scrutiny), gender-specific marriage laws classify based
on sex (and are thus subject to heightened scrutiny).295 Despite the
contrary opinions of several state supreme courts, Loving precludes
the argument that same-sex marriage bans do not discriminate based
on sex because they apply equally to men and women.296 Thus, be290

388 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
Id. at 10–11. See Peter Nicolas, Gay Rights, Equal Protection, and the ClassificationFraming Quandary, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 360–64 (2014) (noting reasons why Loving
cannot be distinguished when determining level of scrutiny for state bans on same-sex
marriage).
292
See supra Part III.A.
293
See supra Part III.B.
294
See supra Part III.C.
295
See supra Part II.C.
296
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8 (equal application of a suspect statute does not preclude
application of the Fourteenth Amendment).
291
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cause gender-specific marriage laws make marriage a function of an
individual’s gender, courts should apply heightened scrutiny when analyzing whether these laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.

